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I. INTRODUCTION
The Posse Comitatus Act (the Act),1 a Reconstruction Era stat-
ute that proscribes use of the armed forces "to execute the laws"
except where expressly authorized by the Constitution or act of
Congress, is the major legal constraint on use of the military for law
enforcement purposes.2 Although recent consideration of this stat-
ute has focused primarily on domestic application,3 the question of
extraterritorial effect also merits attention. As criminal activity
takes on an increasingly multinational character, and as Congress
considers legislation to extend the extraterritorial criminal jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts,4 the responsibility for enforcement of fed-
eral criminal laws overseas has become a matter of greater import-
ance to the United States. Because the United States maintains a
substantial military presence in other countries, questions are likely
to arise with respect to the use of the armed forces to assist in the
extraterritorial application of federal criminal laws. This Article
examines the legal implications of such a use of the armed forces in
light of the Act.
The first part of the Article sets forth the problem and outlines
the manner in which it will be considered. Section II examines the
language of the Act from the perspective of extraterritorial effect.
In Section III, consideration is given to cases involving application
of the Act outside the United States. Section IV reviews administra-
tive interpretations of the Act. Sections II to IV demonstrate that
an authoritative basis for resolving the question of extraterritoriality
is not provided by the statute or by judicial or administrative inter-
pretation. In order to provide a framework for the inquiry in the
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1976).
See commentators cited in note 23 infra.
See cases cited in note 23 infra.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1978); see notes 183-196 and accompanying text
infra.
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remainder of the Article, the principles of statutory construction
relevant to a determination of the extraterritorial application of the
criminal laws are set forth in Section V. Section VI examines the
legislative history of the Act at the time of its initial enactment, and
Section VII considers subsequent congressional action. The conclu-
sion applies the principles of statutory construction to the case law,
administrative interpretations, and legislative history to determine
whether there are any circumstances under which the Act should be
given extraterritorial effect.
1". STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The Posse Comitatus Act provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.'
The component phrases of the statute do not provide useful guid-
ance for determining its extraterritorial applicability. The Act con-
cerns the "use of the Army or Air Force."6 Given the worldwide
mission of the military establishment, this phrase suggests no terri-
torial limitation. One activity prohibited by the statute involves use
of the Army or the Air Force "as a posse comitatus." Traditionally,
the posse comitatus "was a summons to every male in the county,
over the age of fifteen, to be ready and appareled, to come to the
aid of the sheriff for the purpose of preserving the public peace or
for the pursuit of felons." 7 This aspect of the statute is purely do-
mestic in orientation. The statute also prohibits, however, use of the
Army or Air Force "otherwise to execute the laws," and the qualifi-
cation "otherwise" is unlimited.8 The power to "execute the laws"
is derived from a constitutional provision9 that serves as an impor-
5 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1976).
6 Use of the Navy is discussed in note 122 infra.
7 Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7
MiL. L. REv. 85, 87 (1960).
1 See notes 162-163 and accompanying text infra (congressional rejection of an amend-
ment to delete the phrase "or otherwise").
I Article I, § 3 of the Constitution provides that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This constitutional mandate is not
limited to Acts of Congress or treaties of the United States. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64-
68 (1889). This provision also imposes upon the President the duty to enforce the rights,
duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution, the international relations of the
United States, and all the protection implied by the nature of our government under the
1979]
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tant source of the President's authority to take actions overseas. '
The exception for "cases and . . . circumstances expressly author-
ized by the Constitution or Act of Congress" is also unlimited on its
face," as is the provision for a criminal penalty. Because the words
of the statute neither suggest nor deny extraterritoriality, alterna-
tive sources of information, such as case law, administrative prac-
tice, canons of interpretation, and legislative history must be exam-
ined.
III. CASE LAW
A. The Post- World War II Era
The first federal court decision concerning the extraterritorial
application of the Act, Chandler v. United States, 2 involved a
prosecution for treason against the United States based upon
Chandler's radio broadcasting activities within Germany during
World War II. Chandler had been indicted by a federal grand jury
in 1943. In May 1945, he was taken into custody by the United
States Army in Bavaria, but was released in October. In March
1946, he was rearrested by the army in Bavaria. Then, in Decem-
ber 1946, while still in military custody, he was taken to the United
States where he was released to civilian authorities and arraigned
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3. Although these "inherent" powers of the President have
been termed "broad," they are generally considered to be subject to reasonable limitation by
the Congress. Moyer v. Brownell, 137 F. Supp. 594, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1956); see Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring); 19 Op. Att'y
Gen. 685, 686-87 (1890); E. CORWIN, TaE CONsTrrIUrION 149 (13th ed. 1973).
, See note 64 and accompanying text infra.
" In addition to the statutes that authorize the armed forces to perform functions that
serve a military purpose, there are a number of statutes that authorize military participation
in activities that potentially involve civilian law enforcement. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334
(1976) (suppression of insurrections and other unlawful combinations under specified circum-
stances); 16 U.S.C. §§ 23, 78 (1976) (protection of federal parks); id. § 596 (protection of
timber on federal lands in Florida); 18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116 (1976) (protection of foreign
officials, official guests, and other internationally protected persons); id. § 351 (crimes
against members of Congress); 22 U.S.C. §§ 408, 461-462 (1976) (enforcement of the
neutrality laws); 25 U.S.C. § 180 (1976) (removal of persons engaged in unlawful activities
on lands belonging to Indian tribes); 42 U.S.C. § 97 (1976) (execution of quarantine and
health laws); id. § 1989 (execution of warrants relating to enforcement of certain civil rights
laws); id. § 3756 (loan of services, equipment, personnel, and facilities to the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration); 43 U.S.C. § 1065 (1976) (removal of unlawful enclosures
from public lands); 48 U.S.C. § 1418 (1976) (protection of the rights of the discoverer of a
guano island); 50 U.S.C. § 220 (1976) (enforcement of the customs laws).
22 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). In two earlier federal
cases, Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 597 (1882) and Ex parte Mason, 256 F.
384 (N.D.N.Y. 1882), the Act was discussed, although not in the context of extraterritoriality.
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on the old indictment. Later in the month, a new indictment was
returned, and the defendant was tried and convicted on that indict-
ment. 3
On appeal, Chandler contended that his arrest was improper
because, inter alia, the use of Army personnel to make the arrest
violated the Act.'4 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
jected this claim,' 5 citing the presumption against extraterritoriality
normally attributed to criminal statutes.'6 In the course of its dis-
cussion, the court determined that it would be "unwarranted" to
assume that Congress intended the Act "to be applicable to occu-
pied enemy territory, where the military power is in control and
Congress has not set up a civil regime."'' 7
The court's view that the Act is not applicable to the Army in
its capacity as an occupying power rests on solid ground. The
Chandler arrest was made by Army personnel under circumstances
in which the armed forces of the United States invaded and occu-
pied Germany, supplanted the German Reich, and assumed certain
powers of sovereignty. The use of the armed forces for law enforce-
ment purposes was in furtherance of an authorized military purpose
in connection with the war in Europe.'8 Moreover, the military was
acting in accordance with the unquestioned authority of an occu-
pant under international law to exercise the powers of the sovereign
necessary to maintain law and order.'9 The treaties that embody
relevant doctrines of international law constitute the supreme law
of the land.20 In view of these treaties and the militay purposes
, 171 F.2d at 927-28.
" Id. at 933-36. Chandler also contested the extraterritorial effect of the treason statute,
but the court concluded that the treason statute should be applied outside the United States
after considering the language of the statute (proscribing actions "within the United States
or elsewhere"), the development of the constitutional provision on treason, the legislative
history of earlier versions of the treason statute, and Supreme Court cases on extraterri-
toriality. Id. at 929-31.
,5 171 F.2d at 936.
,8 See section V infra.
" Id. (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); MacCloed v. United
States, 229 U.S. 416 (1913); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141, 142 (1866)).
" See 171 F.2d at 935. The type of military occupation in effect in Germany after World
War II has been termed "hostile occupation." G. VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATMON OF ENEMY
TERRITORY 27 (1957). It is defined as "the military occupation of the territory of a country
which surrendered completely and no longer maintains armed forces in the field." Id. The
use of the armed forces to further an authorized military function is not prohibited by the
Act even if there is an incidental benefit to civilian law enforcement. See note 43 infra.
" See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, pt. III, § 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3548-68, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
2' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
1979]
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served by maintaining law and order in occupied territories, there
was express authorization for the use of armed forces for law enforce-
ment purposes in occupied territories, thereby removing such activi-
ties from the prohibitions of the Act. There also is strong evidence
in the legislative history that Congress did not intend the Act to
impair the exercise of Presidential powers necessarily related to the
application of military force in time of war. 2' Therefore, even in the
absence of such treaties, the Act would not apply to actions taken
in accordance with the law of war where application of military force
is otherwise authorized.
Although the Act does not apply to acts by an occupant per-
formed in accordance with the law of war, it does not necessarily
follow that the Chandler opinion is correct in asserting that the Act
has no extraterritorial application whatsoever. Resolution of this
issue requires consideration of the legislative history of the Act
under the principles of statutory construction, which are set forth
in the leading case on extraterritorial application of criminal stat-
utes, United States v. Bowman.22 As Section VI of this Article dem-
onstrates, the Chandler court's characterization of the Act as a mere
"backwash" of Reconstruction Era electoral politics fails to portray
accurately the purposes of Congress in enacting this statute. 23 Ac-
21 See section VI infra.
260 U.S. 94 (1922).
During the course of its discussion, the court summarized the legislative history of the
Act as follows:
The [Posse Comitatus Act] was originally a section inserted into an Army
Appropriation Act as a backwash of the Reconstruction period following the Civil
War. Its legislative history as set forth in Lieber, The Use of the Army in Aid of
the Civil Power, indicates that the immediate objective of the legislation was to put
an end to the use of federal troops to police state elections in the ex-Confederate
states where the civil power had been reestablished.
171 F.2d at 936 (citing Lieber, The Use of the Army in Aid of the Civil Power, OFFICE OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR, Doc. No. 64 (1898)). The court's
discussion of the legislative history, however, is incomplete. Although the use of federal
troops in the electoral process was a significant factor in the early stages of debate on the
Act, the legislative history demonstrates Congressional opposition to the use of troops in non-
electoral law enforcement activities outside the former Confederate States. See section VI
infra. Moreover, had the Chandler court read Lieber's pamphlet more carefully, it would
have noticed that he expressly declined to provide a comprehensive legislative history. See
Lieber, supra at 14. Lieber was concerned primarily with demonstrating that the Act did not
limit the constitutional power of the President to use whatever force might be necessary to
overcome resistance to the execution of the laws. Id. at 55-56. He did not state that the
Act was otherwise invalid, nor did he limit the effect of the Act to electoral matters:
The object of the legislation of 1878 was to place restrictions on the use of the Army
in 'executing the laws,' but this had reference only to the ordinary civil and criminal
[Vol. 54:1
1979] POSSE COMITATUS
cordingly, Chandler does not provide a reliable basis for applying
the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Act.
Two years after the Chandler case, similar issues were raised in
Gillars v. United States." Gillars was convicted of treason for par-
ticipating in psychological warfare against the United States from
1941 to 1945 by making certain radio broadcasts and phonograph
recordings within Germany. Although the circumstances of her ar-
rest were not spelled out in the opinion, it appears that "she was
brought against her will into the District of Columbia from Ger-
many."2 The court of appeals concluded that the district court "was
not required to refuse to try her when she was brought here unlaw-
fully."2 In support of this conclusion, the court cited the Chandler
case and legislative history of the Act as discussed in Chandler.21
The Gillars court then endorsed the narrow holding of the first cir-
cuit in Chandler denying the applicability of the statute to acts
performed by an occupant pursuant to the law of war. The court
expressly declined, however, to endorse the broader dicta providing
law of the land. It was not intended to place restrictions on its use for ordinary
military purposes.
Id. at 34 n.1. Also problematical is the court's failure to consider construction of the Act by
relevent agencies of the Executive Branch. See section IV infra. A further problem in applying
Chandler today results from the court's characterization of the Posse Comitatus Act:
The turning up of this obscure and all-but-forgotten statute is a credit to the
industry of counsel; but we know perfectly well that if members of the Armed Forces
who took Chandler into custody were prosecuted for a criminal offense under [the
Act], such prosecution would surely fail.
171 F.2d at 936. This characterization is no longer accurate in light of recent cases concerning
the Act and renewed attention from commentators. E.g., United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d
77, 84-85 (5th Cir. 1979); Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States
v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14, 15-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976); United States v.
Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 373-76 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974); United States v.
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 193-94 (D.N.D.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Casper, 541
F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Red Feather,
392 F. Supp. 916, 920-25 (D.S.D. 1975); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368, 374-78
(D.S.D. 1974); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1378-82 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975); Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y.
1961); Horbaly & Mullin, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Its Effect on the Administration
of Military Criminal Justice Overseas, 71 Mm. L. REV. 1, 82-92 (1976). See generally
Meeks, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act, 70 MIL. L. REv. 83 (1975); Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics
Reconsidered, 13 Am. Ciua. L. REv. 703 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Note]; Note,
Honored in the Breech: Presidential Authority to Execute the Laws with Military Force, 83
YALE L. REV. 130 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Note].
24 182 F. 2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
2 Id. at 972.
2 Id.
2 Id.
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a total exemption for acts performed extraterritorially.2
In another treason case based upon participation in enemy
radio broadcasts, D'Aquino v. United States,"9 the defendant used
the Act tS challenge the court's jurisdiction. The defendant had
been arrested in Tokyo in 1948 pursuant to a warrant issued by the
Supreme Command for the Allied Power upon complaint of the
Department of Justice." The court simply cited Chandler and
Gillars, concluding: "For the reasons stated in those cases, we hold
this argument without merit."'31 Given the citation of Gillars and the
circumstances of the case-an arrest ordered by a military authority
in an occupied territory-the case does not provide authoritative
guidance as to whether there is a blanket extraterritorial exemption
in the Act.
B. The Vietnam Era
The extraterritorial application of the Act was raised but not
decided in United States v. Cotten.3 2 In 1970, Cotten and a code-
fendant were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States
by knowingly converting money and other property of the United
States Military Exchanges in Japan to their own use and the use of
others. When the indictment was brought against them in the
Northern District of California in 1970, both men, civilians, were in
Vietnam.33 Immediately after the indictment, the State Department
instituted action to revoke their passports and arrange for their
return to the United States. Cotten, in handcuffs and leg-irons be-
longing to the United States, was taken by the Vietnamese to Tan
Son Nhut Airport in Saigon where an agent of the Naval Investiga-
tive Service (NIS) took his passport and made certain that he en-
tered an American military aircraft. On the aircraft, still in irons,
he was seated by two other NIS agents. When he protested that he
was being kidnapped, he was struck in the back of the head, sub-
dued, and secured to the deck with cargo chains. Upon arrival in
Honolulu, he was turned over to the federal marshal. The co-
Id. at 973. The court reasoned that since the Act was "inapplicable in this case, it is
unnecessary to determine whether the statute is extraterritorial in its scope." Id.
29 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951).
Id. at 349.
' Id. at 351.
32 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
471 F.2d at 745.
[Vol. 54:1
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conspirator was returned to the United States under similar circum-
stances.
On appeal, the defendants contended that their in~oluntary
removal from Vietnam and the use of military personnel to trans-
port them to the United States to face charges for civilian crimes
constituted criminal acts on the part of the government, thereby
requiring either a dismissal of charges or a finding of lack of jurisdic-
tion. The court of appeals rejected this contention. Applying the
principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois, 34 the
court concluded that, even if the defendants "were in fact kid-
napped or forcibly removed without their consent to the territorial
limits of the United States . . .under the order of government
34 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (state court jurisdiction not defeated by forcible abduction and
return of the defendant to the United States. The Ninth Circuit also cited Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), a case in which the Supreme Court held that a state court's
jurisdiction was not defeated by bringing a defendant within the court's jurisdiction by
means of forcible abduction even though a federal kidnapping law might have been violated
in the process. Id. at 522-23. The Supreme Court has cited the Ker-Frisbie doctrine with
approval in a case subsequent to Cotten not involving a forcible abduction. See Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (illegal arrest or detention does not void subsequent convic-
tion).
In United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), the second circuit specifically
criticized this aspect of the decision in Cotton, stating that in certain circumstances, any
remedy other than an exclusionary rule (precluding jurisdiction) would be inadequate under
the then-current Supreme Court doctrine. Id. at 276 & n.6 . The Toscanino court ruled that
participation by United States agents in the torture and forcible abduction of the defendant
from Uruguay to the United States would, if proved, defeat jurisdiction. See id. at 275. On
remand, the district court held a hearing and denied the jurisdictional motion on the grounds
that there was no credible evidence of participation by officials of the United States. 398 F.
Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.). The second circuit subsequently limited the sweep of the
Toscanino holding:
[RIecognizing that Ker and Frisbie no longer provide a carte blanche to govern-
ment agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States by the use of
torture, brutality, and similar outrageous conduct, we did not intend to suggest that
any irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's arrival in the jurisdiction
would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court. In holding that Ker and Frisbie
must yield to the extent they were inconsistent with the Supreme Court's more
recent pronouncements, we scarcely could have meant to eviscerate the Ker-Frisbie
rule, which the Supreme Court has never felt impelled to disavow ....
Lacking from Lujan's petition is any allegation of that complex of shocking
governmental conduct sufficient to convert an abduction which is simply illegal
into one which sinks to a violation of due process.
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); accord,
United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). The other courts
of appeals encountering similar questions have either declined to apply Toscanino or have
found distinguishing factors. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1038 (1977); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 985 (1977).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
personnel, that fact does not preclude assertion of jurisdiction."35
Having concluded that a forcible abduction would not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction, the court of appeals applied the same
reasoning in deciding that neither dismissal nor a finding of lack
of jurisdiction would be an appropriate remedy for a violation of the
Posse Comitatus Act. 8 Without specifying what alternative reme-
dies might be available to the defendants, the court declared that
"[tihe remedy for appellants is not a finding that their criminal
activities go unpunished because the proper forum was razed by the
conduct of law enforcement personnel. 37 Because the court held
that no remedies would be available in the criminal proceeding, it
did not determine whether the Act had been violated or whether
the Act was subject to extraterritorial application.
The case law is sparse and inconclusive. Only four cases have
dealt with the issue of extraterritorial application of the Act. Each
arose under wartime conditions. Three were outside the Act's prohi-
bitions because the armed forces at the time lawfully exercised the
police authority of an occupying power. In the fourth case, the court
avoided the question of the extraterritorial application of the Act,
ruling only that a violation of the Act does not deprive a trial court
of jurisdiction over substantive crimes. Because the case law does
not resolve the question of extraterritoriality, it is necessary to turn
to the views of the executive branch to determine whether the Act
has been given an authoritative construction by the agencies in-
volved in its administration.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
A. Military Departments
The military departments have been the primary source of in-
terpretative practice under the Act.8 The executive branch first had
471 F.2d at 747.
38 Id. at 749.
Id. At an earlier point in the opinion, the court said: "Recent legislation and consti-
tutional protections enunciated in the last decade provide viable alternative means of cop-
ing with undisciplined law enforcement activities." Id. at 748 n.11. In rejecting the defend-
ants' jurisdictional contention, the court again referred to the possibility of a remedy, but
did not provide any further guidance:
The remedy requested exceeds that required by the conduct. . . . The Ker
principle controls and the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in Frisbie,
denying that a bar to prosecution was imposed in similar circumstances by the
Federal Kidnapping Act, applies equally to the posse comitatus statute.
Id.
, Courts often have given deference to the interpretation of a statute by executive
[Vol. 54:1
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occasion to consider the extraterritorial application of the Act in
1923 when the Judge Advocate General of the Army issued several
opinions that restricted Army activities in foreign countries.2 In two
agencies involved in the administration of programs affected by the legislation. See, e.g.,
Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 243 (1950); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 138 (1944).
31 See Furman, supra note 7, at 107; Horbaly & Mullin, supra note 23, at 86 n.402.
Initially, administrative interpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act focused on the various
exceptions. On June 19, 1878, the day after the Army Appropriations Bill containing the Posse
Comitatus Amendment was signed into law, the Bill was disseminated by the Army as a
General Order. U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, GEN. ORDERS No. 37, reprinted in [1878] ADJUTANT
GENERAL'S OFFICE, DEP'T OF WAR, INDEX OF GENERAL ORDERS [hereinafter cited as 1878 GEN.
ORDERS]. Three weeks later, the Posse Comitatus Amendment was made the subject of
another General Order setting forth the constitutional and statutory exceptions to the Act.
Id. No. 49. The orders listed the following express exceptions to the Act: U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4 (protection of the Nation against invasion and the states, upon application, against
domestic violence); Revised Statutes (1873) §§ 1984, 1989, 1991 (protection of civil rights) (§
1984 codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1989 (1976); § 1989 repealed 1957; § 1991 repealed 1933); id. §
2002 (protection of the polls (repealed 1909)); id. §§ 2150-2152 (apprehension of Indians,
termination of hostilities between tribes, destruction of distilleries in Indian country, and
other Indian related matters) (repealed 1934); id. § 2460 (protection of United States timber
in Florida) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 596 (1976)); id. §§ 5287-5288 (protection of neutrality
laws) (current version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 461, 465 (1976)); id. §§ 5297-5299 (suppression of in-
surrections) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (1976)); id. § 5577 (protection of rights with
respect to guano islands) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1418 (1976)). Because the statute concerning
discovery of guano concerns islands "not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other govern-
ment," id., it could be contended that inclusion of this provision in the list represented
recognition by the War Department that the Act might be given extraterritorial effect. Alter-
natively, the list might be viewed merely as a compilation of statutes authorizing employment
of the Army without regard to territorial consequences or the effect of the Act.
General Order No. 49 also required all applications for use of the troops to be forwarded
through channels "for the consideration and action of the President." Id. In October, the
directive requiring Presidential approval was repeated with an amplification of authority to
act when there existed an emergency affecting public property or an equivalent situation. See
[1878] GEN. ORDERS, supra, No. 71. This order provided:
Officers of the Army will not permit the use of the troops under their command to
aid the civil authorities as a posse comitatus or in execution of the laws, except as
authorized in the foregoing enactments. If time will admit, the application for the
use of troops for these purposes must be forwarded with a statement of all the
material facts in the case, for the consideration and action of the President; but in
cases of sudden and unexpected invasion, insurrection, or riot, and endangering the
public property of the United States, or in cases of attempted or threatened robbery
or interruption of the United States mails, or other equal emergency, officers of the
Army may, if they think a necessity exists, take such action before the receipt of
instructions from the seat of Government as the circumstances of the case and the
law under which they are acting and the circumstances requiring it to the Adjutant
General for the information of the President.
Id.
In an early Army Regulation, the exception for emergencies was modified to apply to an
"emergency so imminent as to render it dangerous to await instructions requested through
the speediest means of communication." U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, REGULATIONS 1 489 (1895).
Neither the 1878 order nor the 1895 regulation describes the kind of emergency that would
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instances, the Judge Advocate General ruled that the Act precluded
the Army from holding civilian prisoners pending trial before the
United States Court in China. A year later, he held that the Army
could not transport persons convicted in that court to the United
States4 0
Subsequent to the Chandler decision in 1948, the executive
branch has not been consistent on the question of the Act's extrater-
ritorial application. In one case, the Judge Advocate General of the
Army allowed military forces overseas to aid civilian authorities in
the United States in such law enforcement functions as deporta-
tions, criminal identification, administration of lie-detector tests,
and interviews of suspects.41 In another case, however, the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force applied the Act overseas, holding
that military officials were precluded from serving a state's notice
of citation upon an airman stationed in the Ryukyus Islands.42 It
does not appear that the military services have applied the Act
outside the United States or its territories in any circumstance that
would impinge upon the foreign policy powers of the executive or
otherwise frustrate a military purpose.43 Because the Army's opinion
permit the use of the Armed Forces as an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act; rather, each
is discussed in the context of situations in which use of troops would be otherwise authorized.
In an early statement of the property exception, the Judge Advocate General of the Army
determined that use of force to remove trespassers from a military reservation did not violate
the Act. The opinion was based on the theory that the action was not to execute the laws
but merely to protect military property. See WINTHROP, DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL 114 (1880). The development of the emergency and federal property excep-
tions is traced briefly in Furman, supra note 7, at 103-07, in Meeks, supra note 23, at 127-28,
and in U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW HANDBOOK 7.8-.10 (Pam. No.
27-21 1973).
The emergency exception is now embodied in a Department of Defense Directive stating
that the Act "does not apply if: (1) emergency action is needed to prevent loss of life or wanton
destruction of property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when...
local authorities are unable to control the situation;" or (2) federal action is needed "to
protect Federal property and Federal governmental functions and . . . local authorities are
unable or decline to provide adequate protection." U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECrIVE No.
3025.12 (1971).
o See Furman, supra note 7, at 107; Horbaly & Mullin, supra note 23, at 86 n.402.
' See Furman, supra note 7, at 109 n.141. As late as 1971, however, the Judge Advocate
General of the Army noted that, while the Act generally would not restrain the activities of
military investigators overseas, there might be a violation of the Act if military criminal
investigators overseas were used as a backup or in support of criminal law enforcement
activities in the United States. See Horbaly & Mullin, supra note 23, at 88.
12 See Horbaly & Mullin, supra note 23, at 88.
, Meeks summarizes the numerous administrative opinions covering the "military pur-
pose" exception to the Posse Comitatus Act as follows:
Many law enforcement activities performed by military officials benefit the civilian
community as well as the military command. This dual purpose "execution of the
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is based upon citation of Chandler without further examination of
the legislative history,44 it does not provide a satisfactory basis for
resolving the question of extraterritorial effect. Moreover, the incon-
sistent pattern of interpretation since Chandler undermines the au-
thoritative nature of these decisions.
B. The Department of Justice
The other significant source of administrative interpretation of
the Act has been the Department of Justice. 5 Although the Attor-
ney General has not issued a formal opinion on the extraterritorial
effect of the Act, one opinion has suggested that a legislative intru-
sion upon implied executive powers might be unconstitutional.46
The Office of Legal Counsel has opined that actions of the armed
forces that serve a valid military purpose are not limited by the Act,
even if there is an incidental benefit to law enforcement.47 This
law" can, and often does, violate the Act. Where the primary purpose of the action
is to fulfill a legitimate military requirement, no violation of the Act occurs even
though civil law enforcement is incidentally aided. However, where action by mili-
tary officials is taken primarily in aid of civil authorities, the Act is violated even
though the military command is aided incidentally.
Meeks, supra note 23, at 124-25.
" See section VI infra.
E.g., 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 329-31 (1957) (use of federal troops to enforce court-
ordered desegregation in Little Rock, Ark., was expressly authorized by 10 U.S.C. §§ 332,
333 under the circumstances); 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 72 (1894) (military troops cannot be used
to enforce laws against "bandits" operating in Indian territory unless violation falls within
express terms of statute authorizing use of troops against illegal intruders, section 2152 of the
Revised Statutes (1873) (repealed 1934)); 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 570, 571 (1890) (Posse Comitatus
Act did not abridge power to use military troops to enforce Civil Rights Acts expressly
authorized by section 1989 of the Revised Statutes (1873) (repealed 1957)); 19 Op. Att'y Gen.
293, 296 (1889) (federal marshal was precluded by the Posse Comitatus Act from using
military to enforce laws in the Indian Territory of Arkansas); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 333,335 (1882)
(military troops could be used to suppress disorders in the Territory of Arizona under express
authority of sections 5298 and 5300 of the Revised Statutes (1873) (current versions at 10
U.S.C. 331-34 (1976)); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 242 (1881) (military forces cannot be used to sup-
press unlawful organizations unless such organizations fall within types of organizations
contemplated in statutes expressly authorizing military troops); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 71 (1881)
(federal troops could not be used to aid civil authorities in arrest of persons charged with
robbery of a federal facility); 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 162, 164 (1878) (Posse Comitatus Act pre-
cluded federal marshal from using federal troops to overcome armed resistance to collection
of taxes); cf. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 562 (1923) (in absence of emergency circumstances contem-
plated by section 5298 of the Revised Statutes (1873) (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-34
(1976)), President could not use Navy to enforce Prohibition Laws without express congres-
sional authority).
" 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 331 (1957).
'T Letter from Mary C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice, to Deanne C. Siemer, General Counsel, Department of
Defense (Mar. 24, 1978). The letter concerns limitations on participation by military person-
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doctrine, known as the military purpose exception, permits use of
service members at home and abroad without regard to the Act if
the primary purpose of the action serves an authorized function
of the armed forces. In correspondence with the Department of
Defense, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has
stated that the Act has no application overseas."' The corres-
pondence cites the Chandler case, but neither discusses the case
nor provides any rationale for the conclusion on the issue of extra-
territoriality. As previously noted,49 the Chandler case does not
provide authoritative resolution of the issue.
Neither the case law nor administrative interpretations provide
a definite resolution of the issues involved in the question of extra-
territoriality. In order to establish a framework for the remainder of
the inquiry, the next Section examines relevant principles of statu-
tory construction to assess possible limitations on the extraterrito-
rial application of the Act.
V. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The principle of statutory construction regarding the extraterri-
torial effect of United States statutes is summarized by the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law as follows:,
Rules of United States statutory law, whether prescribed by fed-
eral or state authority, apply only to conduct occurring within, or
having effect within, the territory of the United States, unless the
contrary is clearly indicated by the statute."
In applying the Restatement standard to the Act, the dual nature
of the statute should be considered. Not only is it a criminal statute,
applicable to any person who violates its provisions, but it is also a
limitation on the powers of the executive branch of the government.
These considerations are treated separately in this section.
nel in the investigation and prosecution of frauds committed by contractors in the course of
procurement by the Department of Defense. In her letter, Ms. Lawton stated: "[While
Congress intended to keep military force out of civilian government there is no indication that
it meant to affect the Army's internal administration of the performance of its proper func-
tions." Id. See note 43 supra.
18 E.g., Letter from Henry E. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, to J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, Department of Defense (Dec.
4, 1972) (discussing reports of criminal violations and civil frauds outside the United States).
, See notes 12-23 and accompanying text supra.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
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A. Extraterritoriality of Penal Statutes
Statutes defining criminal conduct may be given extrater-
ritorial effect by Congress insofar as they apply to United States
citizens abroad.5 1 Analysis of the legislative intent with respect to
extraterritorial effect requires application of the standard set forth
in the leading case, United States v. Bowman.5 Bowman involved
a federal indictment for conspiracy to defraud a corporation in
which the United States was a shareholder. The crimes were com-
mitted by three American citizens and a British subject outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 3 The trial court
sustained an objection to the indictment based upon the fact that
the penal statute, which proscribed various frauds against the
United States, did not expressly provide for extraterritorial applica-
tion."4 In reversing, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged
test to determine whether a penal statute that is silent on the issue
of extraterritoriality is intended by Congress to be applied extra-
territorially. First, the government must have jurisdiction over the
offense under international law. 5 Second, the extraterritorial
application "depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by
the description and nature of the crime. . ... ,1' With respect to the
second part of the test, the Court declared that statutes defining
crimes against private individuals or their property should not be
given extraterritorial effect unless application outside the United
States is authorized expressly in the statute. Different considera-
tions apply, however, if a statute is enacted to protect the govern-
"' Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); accord, United States v. Gotten,
471 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1974); see RESTATEMENT, supra
note 50, §§ 30-32. The Blackmer Court pointed out:
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is con-
strued to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the
question of its application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries
are concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power,
284 U.S. at 437. With respect to conduct by citizens of other nations occurring outside the
United States, the extraterritorial effect depends on whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
necessary to deal with a potentially adverse effect upon the security or governmental func-
tions of the United States. E.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 948 (1961).
52 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
1 Id. at 95.
11 Id. at 97.
0 Id. Under settled principles of international law, the United States would have juris-
diction over actions engaged in or ordered by United States officials outside the United
States. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, §§ 30-32.
sl 260 U.S. at 97.
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ment of the United States from criminal activity, "especially if
committed by its own citizens, officers or agents."-" The Court
noted that such cases could be divided into two classes. In the first,
extraterritorial application would not be appropriate "because of
the local acts required to constitute" the offenses.59 In the second
class of statutes, however, the offenses "are such that to limit
[their] locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly
to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a
large immunity for [crimes] as easily committed by citizens . . .
in foreign countries as at home."'" The Court concluded that "Con-
gress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the
law that the locus shall include. . . foreign countries, but allows it
to be inferred from the nature of the offense. '1
Application of the principles articulated by the Bowman Court
does not resolve the question of extraterritorial application of the
Act. A potential violation of the Act by conduct outside the United
States would not entail a purely private matter; rather, it would
involve an action by the government's own "officers or agents."
Under Bowman, therefore, the issue is whether a violation of the Act
is a crime that "can only be committed within the territorial juris-
diction of the Government because of the local acts required to
constitute" the offense or whether limitation of the Act "to strictly
territorial jurisdiction would . . . greatly . . . curtail the scope and
11 Id. at 98. The Court cited American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909), wherein it had rejected extraterritorial application of the antitrust statutes in a civil
suit. 260 U.S. at 98. The Court reasoned: "If punishment. . . is to be extended to include
offenses committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to
say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard."
Id. In recent years, the courts have narrowed this exception when dealing with federally
regulated matters by finding that the challenged overseas activities had "effects" within the
United States. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of
Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1010-24 (1976) and cases cited therein.
11 260 U.S. at 98. The Court reasoned that
[tihe same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which
are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government's juris-
diction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its
own citizens, officers, or agents.
Id.
5' Id.
" Id. The Court listed a number of crimes that would be given extraterritorial effect even
though the underlying statutes were silent as to territoriality: certification of a false invoice
by a consul; forging a ship's papers; enticing desertion from the Navy; bribery of a civil,
military or naval officer; crimes dealing with property captured as a prize; stealing property
furnished to the military. Id. at 99-100.
,, Id. at 98.
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usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity."6 The
Act falls between the two classes set forth in Bowman. The statute
makes it unlawful to use the military as a "posse comitatus," a
prohibition that is purely domestic in application. 3 The statute,
however, qualifies the term "posse comitatus" with the phrase "or
otherwise to execute the laws," which leaves open the possibility of
extraterritoriality. Moreover, the phrase "to execute the laws,"
which is derived from the constitutional powers of the President,64
reflects an important source of the President's authority to act over-
seas to protect American lives and property. 5 On the other hand, it
is by no means clear from the nature of the offense prohibited by
the statute that a strictly territorial interpretation would frustrate
its scope and usefulness.
B. Limitations on Executive Authority
The statutes described as having an extraterritorial effect in
Bowman all operated as an aid to executive power by serving to
punish acts traditionally considered to be illegal. The Posse Comi-
tatus Act, however, is a limitation on executive power. 7 It does not
make the object of executive action illegal; rather, it is addressed
solely to the use of an otherwise legitimate means of achieving that
objective.
A congressional limitation on executive authority raises sub-
stantial constitutional questions, 8 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized the constitutional authority of the President to act as the "sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions."69 Although this does not mean that Presidential power over
62 Id.
" See text accompanying note 7 supra.
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936);
Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
See note 60 supra.
" See 7 CONG. REc. 3847 (1878) (remarks of Rep. Knott). The fact that the language of
the Act includes within its sanctions "[wihoever . . . uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws," is some indication that the Act's
restrictions reach "from the Commander-in-Chief down to the lowest officer in the Army who
may presume to take upon himself to decide when he shall use the military force in violation
of the law of the land." Id.
" See 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 331 (1957); Furman, supra note 7, at 127 and authorities
cited therein.
11 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)); accord, United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 330 (1937). These cases did not involve a conflict between federal legislative and execu-
tive powers.
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foreign affairs is exclusive, 70 the degree to which Congress can con-
trol Presidential actions is unclear.7'
When the validity of an act of Congress is questioned, even
when there is a serious doubt as to the constitutionality of the stat-
ute, "it is a cardinal principal that [the Supreme] Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is possible by which
the [constitutional] question may be avoided. 72 A statute should
be construed, consistent with the will of Congress, to comport with
constitutional limitations.73 Executive power in the field of foreign
relations is broader than executive power in the domestic sphere .7
A statute such as the Act might represent a valid restraint on Presi-
dential powers within the United States, but would raise more seri-
ous problems if it were interpreted as limiting Presidential authority
abroad. Therefore, when the exercise of executive powers overseas
is involved, the presumption against extraterritorial application of
criminal statutes also provides a means of construing a statute in a
manner that will avoid a difficult constitutional question. In the
next section, the legislative history of the Act will be examined to
determine whether such a reading of the statute is consistent with
the intent of Congress.
VI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Political Background
The origin of the Posse Comitatus Act may be traced to hostil-
ity of the Democratic House of Representatives to the use of federal
troops by President Grant, a Republican, for law enforcement pur-
"' See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 956 (1968); cf. Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-55 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces
does not give him exclusive power over them).
1, See, e.g., Emerson, The War Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent
Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 187 (1975); Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers
Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. Rav. 1 (1975); King &
Leavens, Curbing the Dogs of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARv. INT. L.J. 55 (1977);
Note, 1973 War Powers Legislation: Congress Re-Asserts Its Warmaking Power, 5 LoY. Cm.
L.J. 83 (1974). See generally G. SUrHERLAND, CONSTrrrIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS
(1919); Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A
Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463 (1976).
72 E.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); Crowwell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); see Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Mass. 1973).
" United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413
U.S. 548, 571 (1973).
11 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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poses in several southern states during the Reconstruction Era and
during the disputed Presidential contest in 1876. Although Samuel
J. Tilden, the Democratic candidate, obtained a plurality of both
the popular and electoral votes, challenges to the certification of the
electors from several southern states left Tilden one electoral vote
short of victory, with nineteen votes in doubt. Congress, with a
Republican majority in the Senate, and a Democratic majority in
the House, was unable to resolve the matter, and turned the issue
over to an electoral commission. The commission gave all disputed
votes to the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, providing
him with a one-vote victory margin and the result was ratified by
Congress. The willingness of Hayes to promise a withdrawal of fed-
eral troops from an active role in the South apparently proved to be
an important factor in obtaining Democratic support for the final
result, known as the "Compromise of 1877." ' 16
When the first version of the Act was debated by the Forty-
fourth Congress in 1877, there was a lame duck Republican Presi-
dent, a Democratic majority in the House, and a Republican major-
ity in the Senate. This version was proposed by the House as a rider
to an Army appropriations bill." The rider, which was domestic in
orientation and purpose, prohibited use of the Army to support
claims of named individuals to hold office in various southern
states, along with a general ban on use of the Army "in the support
of the claims, or pretended claim or claims, of any State govern-
ment, or officer thereof, in any State, until such government shall
have been duly recognized by Congress." 8 This proposal reflected
Democratic dissatisfaction with the continued presence of federal
,1 President Grant ordered military troops to the polls in Florida, South Carolina and
Louisiana to guard canvassers and to prevent fraud. Furman, supra note 7, at 94. For a
general description of the events surrounding the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, see J.
HiCKs, G. MowRy & R. BURKE, THE AMERICAN NATION 44-48 (1971); Furman, supra note 7, at
92-97; Lorence, The Constitutionality of the Posse Comitatus Act, 8 U. KAN. Crry L. REv.
164, 169-74 (1940); Meeks, supra note 23, at 86-93.
,' See Hicks, supra note 75, at 47-48.
" H.R. 4691, 44th Cong., 2d Sess. (1877). The primary feature of the appropriations bill
was a reduction in the size of the Army.
"R 5 CONG. REc. 2152 (1877). During the debate, Congressman Atkins spoke in general
about the "danger" of using large standing armies "to secure the execution of the laws," and
spoke specifically in opposition to the use of the soldiers as "policemen" in the resolution of
disputed claims to office in the South. Id. at 2112 (1877). Congressman Banning criticized
the use of the Army "as a police force" and denounced a statement by the Attorney General
authorizing deputy United States Marshals to use military personnel as a posse comitatus
during the 1876 election. Id. at 2117.
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troops that supported the so-called "carpetbag" governments in
southern states .79
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported a substitute
bill, deleting the rider and troop reductions proposed by the House.'"
Senator Blaine, floor manager of the bill, described the House rider
restricting use of troops as an unconstitutional infringement upon
the powers of the President as commander-in-chief, 8' a view dis-
puted by Senator Kernan. 82 Although there was no effort in the
Senate to restore the House's limitation on use of the troops, the
subject was discussed during debate on an amendment to reduce the
size of the Army. Senator Bayard, who favored the reduction in the
size of the Army, noted the relationship between use of the military
"to enforce the laws" and Reconstruction Era legislation. 81 He
added: "[T]he use of the military as an aid to civil power should
be the very last resort in a government of laws, and. . . under our
system, where the laws are to be enforced in aid of the State, the
State militia, and not the Army of the United States, should be
called upon."," At the conclusion of the Senate debate, the troop-
cut amendment was defeated, and the substitute bill was ap-
proved. 85 When the House declined to recede from its position in
support of the troop-cuts and the restrictive rider, the Forty-Fourth
Congress ended without passage of the army appropriations bill.86
The failure to enact an appropriations bill when Congress ad-
journed in March 1877 left the Army without funds for several
months. President Hayes, citing the absence of appropriations for
the Army, called a special session of Congress to be convened on
October 15, 1877. 87 Prior to the session, President Hayes had begun
the withdrawal of federal troops from Louisiana and South Carolina
and had undertaken other steps to terminate the federal role in
governing the southern states.8 As a result, the debate on the appro-
priations bill focused primarily on budgetary concerns and military
7g See Hicks, supra note 75, at 48.
10 6 CONG. REC. at 2157.
I d.
'2 Id. at 2160-62.
Id. at 2159-60.
Id. at 2160.
Id. at 2162.
See id. at 2171, 2213, 2215, 2217, 2241, 2247-50, 2251-53.
See 6 CONG. REc. 50 (1877).
" See Hicks, supra note 75, at 48. Without the protection of federal troops, the so-called
"carpetbag" governments were quickly replaced by Democratic governments in South Caro-
lina and Louisiana. See id.
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matters such as protecting the Mexican border and dealing with
Indians on the frontier.89 At various points, however, members ad-
dressed themselves to the law enforcement role of the Army. Con-
gressman Atkins, chairman of the House Appropriations Commit-
tee, noted that the withdrawal of troops obviated the need for imme-
diate legislation,"s but suggested that at a later time consideration
be given to legislation regulating use of the Army with respect to
state governments." During consideration of an amendment to de-
crease the size of the Army and a separate amendment to increase
funds for recruiting, the debate turned again to the merits of using
the military as a police force. Congressman Schleicher, who offered
the amendment to increase spending, stated that its purpose was to
recruit troops to protect the Mexican border, adding, "I do not think
that the business of the national Army is to police the States
.... ,92 Taking the opposite point of view, Congressman Calkins
endorsed a role for the Army in dealing with labor unrest. Con-
"' Because of the President's action, the House Appropriations Committee did not in-
clude a rider limiting the use of the Army. H.R. 902, 45th Cong., 1st Sess. (1877) (enacted,
as amended, Act of Nov. 21, 1877, ch. 1, 20 Stat. 1). See 6 CONG. REc. 287 (1877) (remarks of
Rep. Atkins).
6 CONG. REc. at 288.
"Id. Congressman Atkins remarked:
I hope it will be the pleasure of this Congress before it adjourns its labours to mature
and enact such legislation as will in the future be a guide to the Executive of this
country in the use to which the Army of the United States is to be put, and that
henceforth the Army shall never again be employed for such anti-republican and
unconstitutional purposes as that of upholding or overthrowing State governments.
Id. Congressman Durham expressed the hope that such a bill would be forthcoming from the
Judiciary Committee. Id. at 293. Congressman Singleton, while addressing similar matters,
also raised broader concerns about the use of the Army for law enforcement purposes:
I am opposed to maintaining a standing Army for the purpose of putting down labor
strikes in the States, at least until it shall be demonstrated to my mind that the
State authorities are not able to put them down. If we are to deal with such
disturbances, let it be done through the State Legislatures and through State mili-
tia, not through the Army of the United States.
We have had enough of United States troops stationed in the States to interfere
in local affairs, intimidating citizens and to control elections. I believe, sir, the time
has come when the country will no longer permit the Army to be used in any state
for any such purpose.
Id. at 294.
92 Id. at 295.
91 Id. at 296. Congressman Calkins argued that
[t]he recent riots in the States of the North have shown conclusively that for the
protection of property and for the protection of life we must rely upon something
besides the State militia.
. .. [Tihe only security we had at that time was in the Army, as was shown
by the calls for assistance made by the governors of the States upon the Presi-
dent....
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gressman Lutrell responded rhetorically: "Does my friend propose
to maintain a standing army for the purpose of suppressing the
rights of laboring men?"9 His sentiments were echoed by other
members as the debate increasingly focused on the use of the Army
throughout the country in connection with labor strife." Some mem-
bers opposed the use of the Army as a police force, but emphasized
the need for passage of the bill in order to provide compensation for
members of the Army, whose pay had been withheld due to the
failure of the previous appropriations bill. 6
Id. The economic collapse that followed the "Panic of 1873" resulted in frequent labor diffi-
culties throughout the seventies. See Hicks, supra note 75, at 50-51.
' 6 CONG. REC. at 296.
,s E.g., id. at 297 (remarks of Rep. Atkins); id. (remarks of Rep. Blackburn); id. (remarks
of Rep. Crittenden). Congressman Wright declared:
There was . . . a strike among the laboring-men with regard to their rights to
fix the amount of compensation they should receive. . . .No government has the
power .. .to intervene between the workingmen of my District and any other
persons.
Id. at 298. Congressman Pridemore stated that he would vote against the bill in its entirety
in the absence of "a proviso that this Army is not to be used to crush the rights of the States
or trample upon the rights of the citizens. ... Id. He added:
[Tihe only danger that threatens this Government is the growing strength and
ultimate power of the Army to control the citizens. I do not want to see the Army
of the United States ever able to control the labor of this country.
Id. Congressman Banks qualified his support for maintaining the Army "at the maximum
number" by stating that the Army was not to be used "for the purpose of repressing any
movement of the laboring classes of the country . . . .There are other and better methods
of dealing with the interests of labor and maintaining the rights of industry and preserving
the public peace." Id. at 301.
During the debates on the proposed bill and its amendments, the Democrats sought to
portray the Republicans as favoring a large Army "to suppress labor strikes." Id. at 312
(remarks of Rep. Townsend). However, Congressman Baker, a Republican member of the
Appropriations Committee, emphasized that the Republicans shared the Democrats opposi-
tion to the establishment of"a standing Army for the purpose of acting as a local police within
the States or for the purpose of taking from the States the duty. . . of maintaining civil order
within their borders, except where national aid is involved by the State governments in
pursuance of the Constitution." Id. at 307.
Another Republican, Congressman Foster, added: "It is not the purpose of this side of
the House. . .in advocating the retention of the present force to have them used as a mere
police force of the states, but. . . what can the President of the United States do but respond
to calls of the governors and legislatures of the States .. .?" Id. He stated that, in his
opinion, the restrictive proviso in the previous year's bill was "unconstitutional," but that
he would be "willing perhaps to vote for some kind of proper and constitutional restriction
as to the use of the Army by the Executive." Id.
" E.g., id. at 298, 307 (remarks of Rep. Hewitt). Congressman Clymer, a member of the
committee, stated his opposition to the idea "that the Army shall be maintained for the
purpose of preserving order within the States. That belongs legitimately to the States them-
selves." Id. at 299. He added, however, that he was willing to vote for the Committee bill
and put aside for the moment his own "opinions as to numbers and restrictive provisions in
order that the Army may promptly be paid." Id.
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The amendment to decrease troop levels failed, while the
amendment to increase funds for recruiting was approved.9 7 Because
much of the debate had centered around budgetary concerns, com-
pensation for the troops, and strategic issues such as defense of the
Mexican border, the outcome of these votes does not provide signifi-
cant guidance on congressional intent regarding use of the Army for
law enforcement purposes. The debate is important because it
shows that members on both sides of the budgetary issues and from
both parties expressed a critical view about the use of the Army for
law enforcement purposes within the country. 8
During the debate over subsequent amendments to the bill, the
role of the Army was again discussed at various points." One
amendment that prompted substantial discussion was offered by
Representative Hooker. The Hooker amendment prohibited use
of the military forces of the United States ... in any States of the
Union for the purpose of suppressing insurrection, maintaining
order, or supporting any government or pretended government in
such State, unless such forces shall have been first applied for by
the Legislature of such State or by the executive thereof when the
Legislature °cannot be convened."'0
' Id. at 308.
D See notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra. Even Congressman Foster, a member
of the House who defended the Army's law enforcement role, expressed his willingness to
consider legislation limiting use of the Army by the Executive. Id. at 307.
11 Congressman Henderson noted that, in several instances, the Army had been called
into states to deal with labor strife, at the behest of Democratic governors; he added: "[Tihis
side of the House does believe in preserving law and order in the country at all times and
under all circumstances, and ... the Army has no higher duty to perform than to aid in
accomplishing that object wherever a mob attempts to violate the law." Id. at 322. Con-
gressman Townsend responded that "it is not the duty of the Federal Army in times of
peace to act as a police force to preserve order in the States." Id. (remarks of Rep. Town-
send). Although Congressman Giddings voiced support for additional troops to secure the
Mexican border, he was quick to disassociate himself from those who supported a law
enforcement role for the military: "We ask no Federal troops for police purposes either in our
State or any other." Id. at 322. The debate then briefly returned to use of the troops dur-
ing the elections. When Townsend defended the size of the Army as necessary to deal with
problems on the Indian frontier, Congressman Harrison, a fellow Democrat, stated that "the
Indians have been getting the better of us" because troops were being sent into the South
"to prevent men from voting." Id. An amendment reflecting the previous year's concern
about federal interference in state elections was offered by Congressman Walker. The amend-
ment provided:
[N]o person engaged in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States
shall . . . control any troops or armed men at or near the place where any ...
election is held in any state ... unless it be necessary to repel the armed enemies
of the United States ....
Id. at 331. The amendment.was ruled out of order on the grounds that it changed existing
law in an appropriations bill. Id.
,"I Id. at 334.
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Hooker's fellow Democrats, while agreeing with the sentiments of
the amendment, expressed opposition on the basis of several consid-
erations: first, it basically restated the constitutional provision; sec-
ond, President Hayes' withdrawal of troops from Louisiana and
South Carolina rendered the amendment unnecessary; and third, it
was feared that the issue might unnecessarily delay passage of the
appropriations bill.'0' The amendment was defeated, reflecting the
trend of the debate away from the passions of Reconstruction Era
politics and towards a more general consideration of the propriety
of using the military for law enforcement purposes."'
The Senate debate on the Army appropriations bill focused on
the Indian Wars, defense of the Mexican border, and size and struc-
ture of the Army, with no attention to the law enforcement role of
the military.04 Subsequent consideration in the House centered on
the question whether to accept the Senate's appropriation for a force
level of 25,000 men (the authorized level) or insist on the House's
ceiling of 20,000. By a margin of five votes, the Senate version was
accepted without discussion of the Army's law enforcement role.' 5
B. Introduction of a Posse Comitatus Amendment
During the following session of Congress, the Army appropria-
tions bill, as introduced by the House Appropriations Committee,
did not contain any restrictions on the use of the Army for law
enforcement purposes.0 6 On the second day of general debate on the
101 Id. at 334-37 (remarks of Reps. Goode, Reagan, Ellis, and Young).
' Id. at 337. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 137 to 39. Id.
1 Id. at 336. The trend is particularly evident in the remarks of Congressman Ellis:
"[Ilt would be well for a law coming from the proper committee at the proper time
to define, to prescribe, and to limit the use of the Army of the United States. I
would do this more as a warning and for an example and as a teaching to posterity
than from any exigency which is upon us now."
Id. at 336.
"I4 Id. at 412-23.
10 Id. at 510-14.
See 7 CONG. REc. 3554-55 (digest of the bill). During this session, Congress engaged
in a major debate on the size and structure of the Army. Congressman Hewitt, introducing
the bill drafted by the Appropriations Committee, H.R. 4867, 45th Cong., 2d Sess. (1878)
(enacted, as amended, Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, 20 Stat. 152), primarily discussed
reorganization of the Army, but also addressed the role of the military in law enforcement:
Now we are told that we ought to have a large Army and a very large Army, in
order to put down impending strikes. I take issue with that proposition. It is not in
accordance with the theory of this Government that the United States is to main-
tain an Army for the purpose of restraining any portion of its citizens in their just
rights.
I will be told that strikes result in disorder. So, unhappily, they have
heretofore; so they will again. But it forms no part of the duty of the National
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legislation, however, Congressman Kimmel proposed an amend-
ment providing:
[I]t shall not be lawful to use any part of the land or naval forces
of the United States to execute the laws either as a posse comitatus
or otherwise, except in such cases as may be expressly authorized
by act of Congress.' 7
In his introductory remarks, Congressman Kimmel expounded at
length on the traditional fear of standing armies and preference for
state militia. His concern was not with the use of federal troops
against "external foes":
Throughout the entire discussion of the standing army [in the
post-Revolutionary period], it is clear that the American spirit
would not tolerate the possibility of employing the army for the
execution of the laws. The opinion of the times was distinctly and
unanimously against it. This opinion is embodied in the Constitu-
tion. It is evident in the grouping of the powers conferred on Con-
gress. The war power is given in article 1, section 8, in clauses
numbered 11, 12, 13 and 14 ....
, In these four clauses is conferred the power to declare war and
the power to obtain the means for carrying on the war.0 8
He contrasted the war powers with the "separate and distinct" pro-
visions of clauses 15 and 16 of article I, section 8, the powers of the
President with respect to the militia:
In these two clauses is confbrred the power to execute the laws
of the Union, suppress insurretions, and repel invasions, and the
means for exercising this power. These two powers are as distinct
as are the means to be employed for the exercise of them, the Army
Government to repress or to check such disorders. In the first place it is the duty
of the police, where there is one; where there is no police it is the duty of the sheriff;
and where the sheriff is unable to check disorder it is the duty of the State to do it.
It was intended by the framers of the Constitution that the States should not
only be sovereign within their own limits, but that they should maintain order
within their own limits, and, if they fail to do so, that they should and must take
the consequences. The provision of the Constitution which gives authority to the
General Government to furnish troops and give assistance in case of insurrection
was intended only as a last resort, where the State had done its full duty in main-
taining a police and a citizen soldiery and had found itself overpowered.
Id. at 3538.
117 Id. at 3586. The general debate extended over a 4-day period. Id. at 3534-55, 3578-
89, 3631-46, 3669-84. Following the general debate, the bill was given a section-by-section
reading for amendments. During the latter period, a somewhat different version of the
amendment, offered by Congressman Knott, was offered, debated, amended and approved.
The Knott amendment is discussed in notes 122-127 and accompanying text infra.
10 Id. at 3581 (remarks of Rep. Kimmel). See also id. at 3579-81; 3583-84.
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for defense against external foes, the militia for the suppression of
internal resistance, the Army to be created by Congress, because
war is a subject of national jurisdiction only; the militia to be
created jointly by Congress and the States, because the execution
of the laws of the Union and the suppression of insurrections may
involve questions of disputed jurisdiction."9
Although Kimmel's view on the permissible use of the Army in the
domestic sphere would be disputed in the subsequent debate, the
foregoing passage is important because it demonstrates an intent by
the framer of the Posse Comitatus amendment that it not be used
to restrict employment of the Army pursuant to the war powers." 0
Kimmel's proposal was not simply an attempt to define the
appropriate roles of the state and federal governments; rather, he
was concerned with the broader issue of the use of the military for
essentially civilian purposes."' Reports from various military offi-
cers and the War Department were inserted in the record detailing
military participation in law enforcement activities in the North as
well as the South, including requests from military officers for a
policy determination that they not be placed at the disposal of local
law enforcement officials. 1 2 He placed blame for this practice upon
a statement by the Attorney General to the effect that United States
Id. at 3581 (emphasis added).
12o See also id. at 3585.
In his introductory remarks, Congressman Kimmel said:
Notwithstanding this plain intent of the Constitution, the standing Army has been
largely employed in all sorts of uses, at the request of all sorts of people, without
regard even to such law as has been enacted for the direction of its employment in
these unconstitutional uses. Generals commanding military departments, north,
south, and east, report the employment, hundreds of times, of hundreds of detach-
ments of the standing Army in the suppression of strikes, in the execution of the
local laws, in the collection of the revenue, the arrest of offenders, &c., at the
request of governors, sheriffs, and other local state civil authorities and United
States attorneys, marshals, assistant marshals, and internal-revenue officers, in
such open and flagrant violation of the law that these generals suggest the enact-
ment of such laws as will define the duties of the soldiery . ...
Id. at 3581.
M Id. at 3581-82. Congressman Kimmel emphasized that his concern extended beyond
use of the Army in furtherance of Reconstruction Era policies in the South:
Governors, sheriffs, and other State and local civil officers, and the United States
district attorneys, assistant marshals, marshals, collectors of revenue, and other
revenue officers, requested these generals, and these generals at the request of these
officers precipitated [sic] these troops upon the people . . . The generals report
these practices as occurring between 1870 and 1877, five years after the surrender
and continuing until now. Moreover, some of them occurred in Michigan, some in
New York; certainly these States never imperiled the life of the Republic.
Id. at 3582.
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marshals could use the Army as a posse comitatus."3 Of similar
concern to Kimmel was a communication requesting an increase in
the size of the Army in which the Secretary of War had stated:
"Federal troops may be required not only for the protection of our
frontiers, but also to preserve peace and order in our more populous
interior . . . . The Army is to the United States what a well-
disciplined and trained police force is to a city.""' Kimmel declared
that the Secretary's proposal "is too defiant of the American spirit
of public liberty to be permitted to pass unrebuked."' 5
In opposing "an increase in the standing Army to police the
States," Kimmel made only passing reference to events in the
South. Instead, he focused on the "crash of 1873" and the ensuing
"hardship" in which the "masses became discontented and sought
redress through strikes." ' In describing the events that followed, he
spoke almost exclusively of states in the North. Only near the end
of his remarks did he refer specifically to the role of the Army during
the disputed 1876 election and in the southern states during the
Reconstruction period."7 He then returned to his criticism of the
Secretary of War for the proposal to use troops in the urban areas
of the North."18 As the speech drew to a close, it took on a bitterly
partisan cast, describing President Hayes as the "usurper" and ac-
cusing the Republicans of raising false fears of civil disorder in order
to promote an increase in the size of the Army."' He concluded:
I know we cannot hope to do more now than to assist at the
reduction of the Army, and, at the passage of the amendment I
offer, to restrain the Army so that it may not be used as a posse
comitatus without even the color of law. I trust, however, at the
next session we may obviate all necessity for any but a very small
standing Army by the passage of a law to organize, arm, and disci-
"I Id. at 3582. Congressman Kimmel added:
If ... the standing Army of the United States can be used as a posse comitatus
for the execution of the laws, we are living under a military despotism unqualified
and absolute, for what is military despotism but the use of troops against the people
without due authority of law? It matters not how many the troops, nor by whom
commanded, whether a platoon by a corporal or an army by a general, whether
directed by a deputy collector of revenue or the President of the United States
Id.
"' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting George McCrory, Sec'y of War, 1877).
I's Id. at 3583.
116 Id.
17 Id.
1' Id.
119 Id.
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pline the militia to be used to execute the laws of the Union and
suppress insurrection as was intended by "our fathers who framed
the Constitution.' ' 2
0
In summary, Kimmel's introductory remarks in behalf of the
amendment were woven from four strands: first, traditional distrust
of a standing Army and the related preference for the militia and
deference to states' rights; second, the role of the federal army in
the South during the 1876 elections and during the Reconstruction
period; third, the use of the Army for law enforcement purposes
during contemporary labor strife; and fourth, the proposal from the
Secretary of War for use of the Army for domestic purposes. While
Reconstruction Era politics may have been the spark, Kimmel's
remarks make it clear that a deep distrust of a military role in civil
matters-drawn from both historical and contemporary sources out-
side the Reconstruction context-was a major consideration in the
development of his amendment. At the same time, his express sepa-
ration of the military's war powers function from law enforcement
role suggests a strong intention not to interfere with external issues
requiring the application of military force. Moreover, the strong
preference for the role of the states in law enforcement underscores
the absence of an express intention-at least on the part of the
sponsor of this amendment-that the Act have extraterritorial ap-
plication. 12 1
120 Id.
" Although there was little discussion of Kimmel's amendment during the general de-
bate, his remarks were echoed by other members. Many expressed opposition to the use of
federal troops in lieu of state militia to deal with strikes and domestic law enforcement,
particularly in the absence of a request from the states for federal aid. E.g., id. at 3634-35
(remarks of Rep. Butler); id. at 3676 (remarks of Rep. Bridges); id. at 3677 (remarks of Rep.
Durham); id. at 3679 (remarks of Rep. Wright); id. at 3682 (remarks of Rep. Cobb); id. at
3683-84 (remarks of Rep. Cox); id. at 3717 (remarks of Rep. Harrison); id. (remarks of Rep.
Clark); id. at 3718 (remarks of Rep. Ellis); id. at 3726-27 (remarks of Rep. Crittenden); id.
at 3735 (remarks of Rep. Hardenbergh). Other statements echoed the previous year's concern
over the use of federal troops in connection with the electoral process. E.g., id. at 3677
(remarks of Rep. Hewitt); id. at 3677 (remarks of Rep. Mills); id. at 3677-79 (remarks of Rep.
Southard); id. at 3715-17 (remarks of Rep. Harrison); id. at 3718 (remarks of Rep. Ellis); id.
at 3723 (remarks of Territorial Delegate McGinnis); id. at 3724 (remarks of Rep. Sparks).
A differing point of view was expressed by a number of members during both the general
debate and during consideration of an amendment to restore the troop cut contained in the
bill. The Republican leader, Congressman Garfield, addressed Hewitt's remarks about the
size, organization, and deployment of the Army. Id. at 3635. Although he did not discuss the
Posse Comitatus amendment, he defended President Hayes' use of federal troops in domestic
strife as taken in accordance with the Constitution. Id. at 3637-38. Congressman Garfield
entered into the Congressional Record communications from ten northern states requesting
federal troops during the previous year. Id. Congressman Harrison responded by criticizing
[Vol. 54:1
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C. House Action on the Posse Comitatus Amendment
During the reading of the bill for amendment, Congressman
Knott offered the following revision of Congressman Kimmel's
Posse Comitatus amendment:
use of the Army "to protect society against lawlessness." Id. at 3638.
Congressman Humphrey spoke at length on the advantages of the standing Army and
the weaknesses of the militia. Id. at 3587. In an apparent reference to the Army's role in
responding to labor disturbances, he noted that during "the difficulties of last summer, it was
then clearly proven that regular troops were much more effectual, and their duties more
respected, than the State militia." Id. He commented favorably on the "patriotism" of the
troops who, even in the absence of an appropriation, "were called upon to travel from the
Rocky Mountains to the cities of the East and the West to protect property and life from
violence during the 'strikes.'" Id. at 3588. In contrast to Kimmel's emphasis on the role of
the States, Representative Humphrey asserted that the federal government had proved more
effective in protecting liberties, and that the States had actively sought the assistance of the
Army "to restrain domestic violence." Id. at 3589. Congressman Humphrey's speech was
directed primarily at Kimmel's statements about the size of the Army, and he did not address
specifically the Posse Comitatus amendment. Similar remarks, defending the domestic use
of federal troops without specific reference to the Posse Comitatus amendment, were ex-
pressed by Congressman Phillips. Id. at 3615-17. See also id. at 3618 (remarks of Rep. Cald-
well).
Other members opposed Hewitt's views on the size of the Army but expressed some
hesitation about an expanded domestic role for federal troops. Congressman Calkins used the
occasion to note that although some newspapers had construed his remarks during the pre-
vious year's debate as advocating use of the Army to suppress strikes, he did not oppose
strikes "by peaceable and lawful means;" rather: "[m]y idea then was and is now that we
ought to have a standing army to suppress insurrections of all kinds where they threaten
the public peace. But in no way do I believe that an Army should be kept as a menace to
prevent that which is lawful." Id. at 3643. After discussing the size of the Army and the need
for a force sufficient to deal with problems on the Mexican border and Indian frontier, he
criticized Hewitt's proposed reliance on the militia. Id. at 3645. Although Calkins called for
the Army to be available "to suppress these insurrections when they . . . pass beyond the
control of a sheriff's posse comitatus," he did not advocate a direct military role in law
enforcement:
[W]henever the governor of any State who is the magistrate and the executive,
charged with the execution of the law of that particular State, sees danger immi-
nent and believes it to be for the best interest of all that the military should
interfere, he should have the power to call upon the President for such military force
as is necessary to preserve peace and protect life and property.
Id. Sensitive to changes of federal interference in state affairs, he even suggested that the
state governor should control the federal forces. Id. Congressman Schleicher, a Democrat,
noting that other members had discussed the use of the Army "in the States as a police force,"
stated that it was the constitutional duty of the President to respond "when called upon under
proper circumstances. . . to aid the authorities of a State in suppressing riots and domestic
violence." Id. at 3669-70. Similarly, Congressman Cannon declared: "I do not want the Army
to be used to police the States," but noted that the previous year's resort to troops had been
"put in motion, as the Constitution provides." Id. at 3681. Congressman Cain noted that
federal troops had been employed in his state "in pursuance of a call made by the executive
of the State in pursuance of authority conferred by the Constitution." Id. at 3683. Use of the
Army in the South to protect "citizens who desired to exercise the rights of citizenship and
to speak and vote as they thought best" was defended by Congressman Henderson. Id. at
3717.
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From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to
employ any part of the Army of the United States as a posse
comitatus or otherwise under the pretext or for the purpose of
executing the laws except in such cases and under such circum-
stances as such employment of said force may be expressly author-
ized by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act
shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employ-
ment of any troops in violation of this section; and any person
violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or
by both such fine and imprisonment. '
Congressman Knott was concerned with the use of the military to
achieve objectives that were within the existing or potential capabil-
ities of state and federal civilian authorities. '23He commented favor-
ably on the role of federal troops when acting under constitutional
'2 Id. at 3845 (remarks of Rep. Knott). In contrast to the Kimmel proposal, see text
accompanying note 107 supra, the Knott proposal specified criminal penalties for violations
of the Act, deleted the reference to naval forces and made several other changes in phraseol-
ogy not relevant here. One commentator has speculated that the reference to naval forces was
deleted as not germane to an Army appropriations bill. Meeks, supra note 23, at 100-01.
The Republican leader, Congressman Garfield, raised a point of order against the amend-
ment, contending that by imposing "a new penalty" and placing "the command of the Army
into the hands of the Congress," the amendment violated a rule of the House against changing
existing law through an appropriations bill except for purposes of "retrenchment." 7 CONG.
REC. at 3845. Knott responded that the amendment was simply designed to enforce existing
law: "[e]ven without this amendment it will be unlawful for an officer of the United States
to use any portion of troops under the pretext of enforcing the law unless he is expressly
authorized to do so by an act of Congress." Id. The point of order was overruled for substan-
tially the same reason:
The first portion of this section merely recites what is the existing law as appears
from the face of the amendment, and it is therefore but a re-enactment of what the
law now is, and the Chair is of the opinion that that portion of the section is clearly
within the rules. As to the latter portion of the proposed section, the Chair is in
some doubt as to whether it is within the rule; but as this kind of legislation in
appropriations bills has been customary heretofore the Chair will not take the re-
sponsibility of ruling it out, but will submit the section to the committee.
Id. at 3846. (emphasis added).
'2 Id. at 3846-47. When he introduced the amendment, Congressman Knott added:
[T]he Army of the United States has been used in a hundred instances under
the pretext of enforcing the laws without one scintilla of authority to be found in
any enactment of Congress . ...
It occurred to me that now, when this country is in the enjoyment of profound
peace, is a fitting time for us to say that this practice shall no longer continue; that
the Army of the United States shall be amenable to the civil law; that it shall not
be employed under the pretext of enforcing any law, unless authority is expressly
conferred by statutory enactment.
[Vol. 54:1
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authority in suppressing domestic violence, but condemned their
role in routine law enforcement.124 Although proponents of the
amendment criticized use of the Army during the 1876 election,2 "
Congressman Knott stated that the amendment would not preclude
use of federal troops "to protect the elective franchise" or
"enforcement of . . the civil-rights bill" because Congress had
provided express statutory authority to use the military in those
circumstances. 26
The extraterritorial effect of the Act was not addressed by Con-
gressman Knott, and his remarks do not reflect any concern with
limiting the use of the military in foreign affairs or in support of the
war powers. In response to questions about the scope of the amend-
ment, however, he used sweeping language:
It applies to every employment of the Army or any part of the
Army of the United States in cases for which there is no congres-
sional authority upon our statute book.'2
Given the focus of the debate on domestic matters, this statement
alone does not provide direct support for extraterritorial applicabil-
ity. It does support the military purpose doctrine, which holds that
actions in furtherance of an authorized military function do not
violate the Act even if civilian law enforcement is an incidental
beneficiary.
Foreign affairs implications were raised, however, in a proviso
offered by Congressman Schleicher of Texas:
Provided, That this section shall not apply on the Mexican
border or in the execution of the neutrality law elsewhere on the
national boundary line.'2
2I Id. at 3849. Congressman Knott added: "[T]his amendment is designed to put a stop
to the practice, which has become fearfully common, of military officers of every grade
answering the call of every marshal and deputy marshal to aid in the enforcement of the
laws." Id. Similar views were expressed by Rep. Hewitt. Id. Opposing views were expressed
by Rep. Burchard, id. at 3848, and Rep. Aldrich, id. at 3849-50.
1 E.g., id. at 3848 (remarks of Rep. Hooker); id. at 3850-52 (remarks of Rep. Southard);
id. at 3850-51 (remarks of Rep. Ellis); id. at 3852 (remarks of Rep. Robertson). See also id.
at 3847 (remarks of Rep. Mayhan); id. at 3850-51 (remarks of Rep. Herbert). Opposing views
were expressed by Rep. Hale, id. at 3847, and Rep: Dunnell, id. at 3851.
' Id. at 3849; see note 133 and accompanying text infra.
2 Id. at 3849. His introductory remarks emphasized the limited nature of Presidential
authority to use the Army. Id. at 3847. In addition, the debate makes it clear that the
Amendment was seen as applicable to subordinates following an order to engage in unauthor-
ized acts, as well as to superiors who issued the orders. Id. at 3847-48 (remarks of Reps.
Pridemore, Knott, Elam, Mayhan, and Hooker); id. at 3849 (remarks of Rep. Mills); id. at
3851 (remarks of Rep. Herbert).
"' Id. at 3848 (remarks of Rep. Schleicher). The neutrality laws prohibited, inter alia, a
person within the United States from providing weapons or other assistance to private vessels
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The main focus of Schleicher's remarks dealt with "the robbery of
cattle" on the Mexican border, 29 but he also addressed external
affairs. 3 ' Schleicher's proviso was rejected, 3' which provides some
indication of congressional intent that the Posse Comitatus Act not
be limited territorially. The debate on Schleicher's amendment,
however, focused primarily on the Knott amendment in general
rather than Schleicher's proviso. 3 2 The significance of Schleicher's
amendment also is minimized somewhat as a result of Representa-
tive Knott's remarks on the provision in his amendment for excep-
tions based upon expressly authorized use of the Army:
There are, as I have already remarked, particular cases in which
Congress has provided that the Army may be used, which this bill
does not militate against, such as the case of the enforcement of
the neutrality laws, the enforcement of the collection of customs
duties and of the civil-rights bill, and one or two other instances.,,
Moreover, the language of the proviso-"on the national boundary
line"-suggests a domestic orientation to the proviso, and an im-
plicit understanding that the Posse Comitatus amendment had no
application across the border. Consequently, while some importance
can be attached to the defeat of Schleicher's proviso, the express
statutory authority for use of the troops to enforce the neutrality
armed for a military expedition against a nation at war with another nation with whom
the United States was at peace. See R.S. § 5258 (1873) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 461
(1976)).
I Id. Congressman Schleicher's remarks suggest a contemporary understanding that the
military did not have the authority to engage in routine law enforcement actions:
[O]ne of the great difficulties in the way of the efficient protection of the
Mexican line and in the prevention of the robbery of cattle on that line is the
absence of the power in the soldiers to inquire when they meet Mexicans driving
cattle as to the business in which they are engaged.
Many of the owners of Texas cattle live in Mexico, and frequently men come
over as employees of the Mexican owners. If they happen to meet a scout of soldiers,
the soldiers are not bound to inquire whether they are robbers or employees. Conse-
quently it has been the custom, as it was the only efficient mode of service to send
some civilian along as deputy sheriff, who had the right to find out and if necessary
to assist in making the arrest. That would be completely broken up unless this
amendment is adopted.
Id.
13 Id. Congressman Schleicher reasoned: "[T]here may be, in the case of war between
England and Russia, a necessity for such provision on the Canadian frontier and elsewhere;
that the execution of the neutrality laws will make it necessary for civil officers to accompany
the military." Id.
" Id. at 3849.
" Id. at 3848-49.
" Id. (emphasis added). See note 39 supra (list of statutes in effect in 1878 but author-
ized use of the armed forces for law enforcement purposes).
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acts makes it somewhat uncertain whether the House rejected the
amendment in order to apply the Posse Comitatus amendment to
foreign policy matters, or whether the Schleicher amendment was
regarded as unnecessary.
Another source of congressional intent may be found in the
debate over the amendment's requirement that use of the Army be
"expressly authorized by act of Congress." In contrast to the legisla-
tion finally adopted, the Knott amendment made no exception for
actions authorized by the Constitution. This led several members
to oppose the amendment as an unwarranted restriction on the
Presidential authority to act under article IV, section 4 of the Con-
stitution to protect States, upon application, against "domestic
violence." '34
In response, several supporters of the Knott amendment as-
serted that the President could not act even under application from
the States, without express authority from Congress.'35 Although he
did not expressly reject this view, Congressman Knott endeavored
to assure the House that the legislation was not designed to restrict
use of the Army in furtherance of article IV, section 4 of the Consti-
tution, which guarantees to the States a republican form of govern-
ment.'36 Although article IV, section 4 does not mention the Army
expressly, Congressman Knott's remarks should be viewed in the
context of longstanding express statutory authority for the Presi-
dent to use military force under that provision of the Constitution.'3
'l 7 CONG. REC. at 3846 (remarks of Rep. Banks); id. at 3847 (remarks of Rep. Hale); id.
at 3848-49 (remarks of Rep. Lapham); id. at 3851 (remarks of Rep. Gardner). Article IV,
section 4, of the Constitution does not expressly authorize the use of federal troops; rather, it
provides:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
' E.g., id. at 3845 (remarks of Rep. Hooker); id. at 3851 (remarks of Rep. Tucker).
125 Id. at 3849. Congressman Knott stated:
The Constitution, sir, guarantees to every State a republican form of government
and protection from domestic violence on the call of the governor of the State, when
the Legislature cannot be convened, and that provision is enforced under a statute
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all possible causes that can arise under it.
The amendment proposed does not conflict with that and it is surprising to me that
gentlemen should be so sensitive when an attempt is made here to prescribe the
limits and bounds beyond which the Army of the United States cannot go.
Id. at 3849. Knott and the leadership endeavored to assure the House that the amendment
would not work a change in the legal bases for use of the Army. See note 122 and accompany-
ing text supra.
117 Authority for the President to mobilize state militia to combat domestic violence
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As a result, Congressman Knott's remarks do not resolve the impor-
tant question as to whether the House intended to require that the
use of federal troops be mentioned expressly even when the federal
executive is empowered to act, and the only effective manner of
acting is through application of military force.
Because Congressman Knott did not discuss whether his
amendment permitted the use of federal troops in furtherance of the
President's constitutional powers alone, irrespective of whether
Congress enacted legislation authorizing use of the Army, 'it can be
argued that the amendment and his references to the enabling stat-
utes suggest an intent that there be no use of the troops in the
absence of such statutes. Under this interpretation, the Posse Comi-
tatus amendment would preclude the President from fulfilling con-
stitutional responsibilities even in circumstances where the only
effective way to execute those responsibilities would be through the
application of military force. Such an interpretation would raise a
serious constitutional question by placing the Act squarely in con-
flict with executive powers arising under the Constitution.' 3
It is not necessary to adopt such a rigid interpretation of the
requirement for express authorization in order to effectuate the pri-
mary purpose of the Act-to prevent the military from exercising
those law enforcement responsibilities otherwise within the existing
or potential capabilities of state forces and federal civilian officers.
An alternative interpretation of the intent of the House is that the
phrase "expressly authorized" refers primarily to the power of the
United States to act, and that use of federal troops is permissible
when the action called for necessarily requires the application of
military force. This interpretation would square the numerous
statements in opposition to the use of federal troops for law enforce-
ment with the House's recognition that when civil authorities were
unable to suppress domestic violence, military force would be
needed. It would also be consistent with Congressman Kimmel's
view of the predecessor amendment as inapplicable to the war pow-
ers. Moreover, this interpretation permits the statute to be read in
a manner that avoids an irreconcilable conflict with Presidential
authority. It reflects the concern expressed in the House that the
dates from the Act of May 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 264. Use of federal troops for this purpose was
first authorized in the Act of Feb. 28, 1795, 1 Stat. 424.
13 See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (Congress may
authorize use of the military in conjunction with legislative powers under the interstate
commerce clause). But cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-55
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (limiting exercise of presidential power).
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military not be used in lieu of civilian authorities if the matter could
be dealt with without application of military force. In the context
of an overseas application, this would support the use of military
force only when such force would suffice as, in an Entebbe-style raid
designed to save lives, but not necessarily where a routine law en-
forcement matter is involved, as in an investigation and arrest of a
United States citizen who has committed a criminal act in the
United States.'39
Aside from the Schleicher amendment and the general discus-
sion of constitutional powers, there were no other statements poten-
tially touching upon territorial limitations. The Posse Comitatus
amendment was approved by the House in the form introduced by
Congressman Knott.140
D. Senate Modification of the Amendment
The Army appropriations bill reached the Senate floor with less
than 2 weeks remaining in the session.' The Senate Appropriations
Committee had deleted the Knott amendment, 2 and the main
focus of debate in the Senate concerned the size of the Army.'
While discussing this issue, several senators touched upon the law
enforcement role of the Army.' Senator Bayard addressed the
"I If the investigation and arrest took place overseas, absent foreign policy considera-
tions, the extraterritoriality of the Act would be squarely presented without the complications
of the war powers and foreign affairs responsibilities of the President.
40 The unrecorded vote in the Committee of the Whole was 120 to 112. 7 CONG. REc. at
3852. The recorded vote in the House on this amendment was 130 to 117. Id. at 3877. The
vote was split almost strictly along party lines. Compare id. at 3877 with 6 CONG. REc. 53
(1877) (party divisions in the Forty-fifth Congress shown in the vote for Speaker).
" 7 CONG. REc. 4181 (1878) (remarks oi ben. Blaine).
4 Id. Senator Blaine, for the Appropriations Committee, explained the differences be-
tween the House bill and the version reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Id.
at 4180-81. When he reached section 29 of the House bill, which contained the Knott amend-
ment, he simply stated: "The Committee of Appropriations recommends that that be struck
out." Id. at 4181. When questioned whether the Committee's position was unanimous in
relation to section 29, he responded: "It is not." Id. (remarks of Sen. Blaine). The Senate
agreed to limit debate under the 5-minute rule (per member) on all provisions except two,
one of which was section 29. Id.
"I Id. at 4181. The House had passed a bill reducing the force from 25,000 to 20,000
troops. The version proposed by the Senate Appropriations Committee did not follow the
House in this respect. Id.
"I Senator Sargent, who would subsequently play a prominent role in support of a Posse
Comitatus amendment, asked the Senate to separate concern about misuse of the Army from
the role of the Army on the frontier:
The Army is the police force on the frontier, throughout the Territories, in
Arizona, the borders of Texas, the borders of the Indian Territory, up in Montana,
and Idaho, and Colorado.
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Knott amendment directly, declaring that he wanted "to see. re-
stored to the bill an amendment of the House of Representatives
...that prevented the improper use, the unlawful use of the
United States Army.' '4
In Senator Bayard's absence on the following day, Senator Ker-
nan introduced the Bayard proposal.'46 The source of the immediate
We all have a common interest in the peace and prosperity of the Territories.
For this reason, without any partisan feeling at all, without believing that the Army
will ever be used for any purpose hereafter that all would not thoroughly approve
of, I trust there will be no serious objection to [an Army of 25,000 soldiers].
Id. at 4583. Senator Maxey also indirectly referred to the issues raised in the House:
A great deal in the way of arousing prejudice has been said upon this subject as to
the mode and manner in which the Army has been used here. There is as much
injustice in attempting to arouse prejudice against an army because they obey the
lawful orders of those who are placed over them as there would be in attempting to
arouse prejudice against a sheriff for obeying the proper judgments, orders, decrees,
and sentences of a court of competent jurisdiction. It is a question, therefore, not
of politics, but it is a question of the protection of those entitled to protection under
the Constitution.
Id. at 4185. Senator Merrimon stated that while he did not favor using an appropriations bill
as a vehicle for general legislation, he wanted to express his feelings about use of the Army:
This is no time for the purpose of keeping up the Army to control elections in the
States and to terrorize over the people; and for one I will not consent to do it.
Id. Senator Merrimon spoke at greater length on the use of the Army during the elections
during the subsequent debate on a Posse Comitatus amendment. Id. at 4245. Senator Butler
agreed that the the troops had been "used improperly," but suggested it was not the fault of
the Army. Id. at 4185-86.
" Id. at 4192.
'" Id. at 4239-40. The amendment provided:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of
the Army of the United States as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, [under the
pretext] for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such
circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized BY THE
CONsTrruTION or by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act of
Congress shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of
any troops in violation of this section; and any person violating the provisions of
this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Id. at 4240 (emphasis and brackets added; the brackets enclose material in the House bill
deleted in the Bayard-Kernan amendment; the material in upper-case was added to the
House bill in the Bayard-Kernan amendment).
When Bayard returned to the debate, he declared that his object in offering the amend-
ment "was to obtain passage of the military appropriations bill at the earliest possible day."
Id. at 4296. In an apparent reference to the effect of a similar measure in causing the failure
of the House and Senate to pass the Army appropriations bill in the previous Congress, he
expressed hope that the amendment would "prevent disagreement between the two Houses"
and would enable the Senate "to unite with the House in a desire to enact this bill into a
law." Id.
Bayard offered the following explanation of his changes in the House bill, suggesting a
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grievance noted by Senator Kernan was a circular issued by the
Attorney General during the 1876 election authorizing federal mar-
shals to command military forces on the theory that all persons over
the age of 15, including military personnel, comprised the posse
comitatus available to law enforcement authorities. 4 7 Senator Beck
added:
I understand the whole object of this section as amended is to limit
the use by the marshals of the Army to cases where by law they
are authorized to call for them, and not to assume that they are in
any sense a posse comitatus to be called upon when there is no
authority .... "
If this had been the extent of the debate, it would provide substan-
tial evidence of Senate intent to limit narrowly the scope of the
bill. The subsequent debate, however, indicates that the Senate
was concerned with more than the traditional act of the sheriff or
marshal in raising a posse comitatus. An opponent of the measure,
Senator Windom noted:
[T]he discussion thus far has proceeded on the assumption that
it was only when the Army was used as a posse comitatus that it
bipartisan cast to the proposal:
Upon a friendly and personal consultation with gentlemen of both parties in this
Chamber, I found the idea was acceptable to permit the section to stand as the
House had sent it to us, with the evisceration of three or four words capable of an
uncivil construction, and the insertion of one or two more that should have the
effect to round off the proposition that the Army of the United States is the creature
of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and that in this land we know
of no power that is not subordinate to law.
Id. He portrayed the amendment as nothing more than a description of the existing state of
the law:
[I]n the present case the proposition was to recite that it was not lawful to employ
the Army of the United States in violation of the law or the Constitution, but that
the method of its appointment must simply be in accordance with the law of its
creation and the powers whereby alone it must exist. In that it struck me as being
nothing more than a truism.
Id.
147 Id. Senator Beck, a supporter of the amendment, traced the 1876 circular to an
Attorney General's opinion issued in 1854, which stated:
[Tihe posse comitatus comprises every person in the district or county above the
age of fifteen years ... whatever may be his occupation, whether civilian or not,
and including the military of all denominations .... The fact that they are organ-
ized as military bodies, under the immediate command of their own officers, does
not in any way affect their legal character. They are still the posse comitatus.
Id. (quoting 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466, 473 (1854)). Senator Teller also indicated that his support
for the amendment stemmed from a desire to reverse the opinion of the Attorney General and
subsequent use of the Army of federal marshals. Id. at 4296.
I'l Id. at 4241.
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was forbidden. But the section says "when used as a posse comita-
tus or otherwise;" whether used in that way, or as a portion of the
Army, it is forbidden.'
Those opposing the amendment claimed that it would leave the
United States without a mechanism to enforce the laws.' A more
"I Id. at 4241 (emphasis added). In response to Senator Windom's statement, Senator
Sargent replied, "[Use of the Army] ought to be [forbidden] unless it is according to the
Constitution and the laws." Id.. Later in the debate, Senator Windom repeated his concern
with the phrase "or otherwise":
I want to make only a single suggestion with reference to what I think to be a fair
construction of this proposition as it now stands amended. It should be read as if
the words "posse comitatus or otherwise" were omitted, because the words "or
otherwise" cover everything, so that I will read it:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part
of the Army of the United States for the purpose of executing the laws, except in
such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may
be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress.
Id. at 4245. Senator Edmunds was also troubled by the expansive implications of the phrase
"or otherwise." Id.
Senator Hill, a supporter of the amendment, expessed a different view; he urged that
the phrase "as a posse comitatus or otherwise" be struck in its entirety because it implied
that previous use of the Army as a posse comitatus was lawful. Id. at 4246. Indeed, his entire
concern was with the posse comitatus problem and did not even acknowledge that the mili-
tary could ever be used to enforce the laws; instead, he contended that when properly sum-
moned, the Army would merely suppress domestic violence, leaving execution of the laws to
civil authorities. Id. at 4247. Although he proposed an amendment to delete the aforemen-
tioned phrase, id. at 4248, Hill later determined that the undesired implication was not
present and he withdrew the amendment. Id. at 4295. Another supporter of the amend-
ment, Senator Maxey, agreed that the military did not fall within the common-law posse
comitatus available to the sheriff, but noted:
Section 29 . . . is simply in accord with the law which authorizes the military to
be called out to aid in the execution of the laws in all cases where the Constitution
of the United States and laws made in pursuance thereof justify it, and in no other
case can they be called or ought they to be or can they be lawfully so called.
Id. at 4303.
150 E.g., id. at 4241, 4243 (remarks of Sen. Blaine); id. at 4295;96 (remarks of Sen.
Kirkwood). Senator Merrimon responded that the amendment simply placed the federal
marshal on the same footing as the local sheriff; that is, he could call on the citizenry to act
as a posse comitatus. If civil measures failed, then troops could be called in "after a proclama-
tion was issued in pursuance of the laws of the United States." Id. at 4244-45. Similar views
were expressed by Senator Hill. Id. at 4248.
Another objection to the amendment related to the implication that it contemplated
criminal penalties for actions by the President, who, it was suggested, was subject only to
impeachment. Id. at 4298 (remarks of Sen. Matthews). Senator Bayard responded: "I never
heard before that the President of the United States or that any other officer of this govern-
ment is less responsible to the laws of the land for his infraction of them than the humblest
citizen." Id. at 4298. See also id. at 4302-03 (debate concerning application of the Posse
Comitatus amendment to the Secretary of War and senior Army officers). An opponent also
argued that the amendment would hinder the operations of the Army by permitting citizens
to seek out indictments against individual officers. Id. at 4299 (remarks of Sen. McMillan).
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serious question arose concerning whether the amendment pre-
vented members of the military from acting if they were present
during an emergency and possessed no "express" authority to act.
Senator Merrimon, a supporter of the amendment, responded:
The soldier standing by would have interposed if he had been a
man, but not as a soldier. He could not have gone down in pursu-
ance of the order of his colonel or captain, but he would have done
it as a man .... I
A contrasting view was presented by another supporter of the
amendment, Senator Hill, who asserted that the amendment did
not limit the ability of soldiers to act in response to orders directed
at saving lives.5 2 Although the matter was not conclusively resolved
during the debate, Senator Hill's preference for an emergency ex-
ception permitting reliance on military orders is not inconsistent
with the overall focus of the amendment on normal law enforcement
functions.
As the debate progressed, the opponents agreed that the Army
"ought not to be used for any purpose not authorized by the Consti-
tution and laws," but contended that the failure to specify the
proper uses of the Army rendered the amendment a dangerous
limitation on executive power because it was too indefinite. 5 3
The proponents responded to the contention that law enforcement would be impeded, but
largely ignored the other arguments.
"I Id. at 4245 (emphasis added). In response to a similar question, Senator Merrimon
added:
If the General of the Army had been there he could not have commanded them as
soldiers, but every one of them would have been bound by the law of nature, by
the common law of this country, by the common law of Mississippi, to interpose to
prevent the wretches who were about to take the life of an innocent person.
Id. at 4246.
"I Id. at 4247. Senator Hill commented:
Of course there are occasions in all countries where under the laws it is the duty of
every man to save life, to save property, to suppress crime. I care not whether he is
a soldier or whether he is a citizen, whether a man or a woman, I care not what he
is, there are times when, in order to suppress violence, in order to suppress crimes,
it is the duty of every man equally to act and to obey anybody's orders, or to obey
anybody's information who gives notice of it.
Id.. Senator Hill's views are consistent with present Department of Defense policy that
permits military action in an emergency situation. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DmEcMVE No.
3025.12, T V.C.1.a.(1971).
"I E.g., 7 CONG. REc. at 4296-97 (remarks of Sens. Kirkwood, Edmunds, and Burnside).
Senator Conkling stated that he could vote for the measure in "an appropriate bill," but said
he would oppose this measure because the timing made it appear as an unwarranted criticism
of the administration. Id. at 4303-04. Several members expressed opposition on the grounds
that it should not apply to subordinates, particularly without greater definition. E.g., id. at
4241, 4299-301 (remarks of Sen. McMillan); id. at 4296 (remarks of Sen. Kirkwood); id. at
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Senator Edmunds stated that the amendment would serve as an
impediment to the lawful exercise of the President's implied
powers. 154 The opposition was particularly concerned about the
amendment's limitation to actions "expressly authorized."'' 5 In
4299 (remarks of Sen. Howe); id. at 4301. (remarks of Sen. Christiancy).
Senator Christiancy proposed an amendment to limit application to the "Secretary of
War, the General or Lieutenant-General of the Army, or commander of any military depart-
ment," id. at 4302, but the amendment was rejected, id. at 4303. Opponents of the Chris-
tiancy amendment generally countered that the Posse Comitatus amendment was consistent
with the doctrine that subordinates are only required to obey "lawful orders." E.g., id. at
4298. Senator Bayard added that although ignorance of the law would not be a defense, a
person could not be convicted unless the violation was "knowing and willful." Id. at 4300-01.
An amendment to,express that understanding was adopted. Id. at 4302.
I" Id. at 4241. Senator Edmunds said:
[T]he Constitution says that the President of the United States shall be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and of the Navy; it says in the next place that
he shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed; that is, all laws. Then the
question at once arises whether under the Constitution of the United States, saying
no more, it being the duty of the President to see that the laws are faithfully
executed and he being Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Constitution does not
expressly authorize him to use the Army wherever power is lawfully to be required
to execute the laws.
Id. He added that the amendment would leave the President without the power to use federal
troops to enforce the internal revenue laws. Id. at 4242.
"I Senator Blaine declared:
I think any officer would be loath to use that authority unless he had a case that
fitted exactly and perfectly some statute made and provided, and it would effec-
tually cripple and paralyze all possibility of a platoon of soldiers being used where
there was a forcible resistance to the collection of the revenue, where there was a
forcible combination to resist the execution of the revenue laws.
Id. at 4241. Addressing Senator Kernan, the sponsor of the amendment, Senator Hoar asked:
[D]oes the Senator from New York mean to enact that it shall be a penitentiary
offense for the President of the United States or anybody under him to do an act
which by fair implication from the Constitution of the United States it is his duty
to do?
Id. at 4242. Senator Kernan responded:
I do not.
I will say but a word to explain what I mean by "express authority." Unless there
is some law that says that if there shall be resistance to the collection of the revenue
the marshal may call in the military as a posse, I deny the right to so use it,
notwithstanding the opinion of any Attorney-General. Unless there be some express
authority to do it, I am opposed to leaving it to any Attorney under the general
authority of the President to see that the laws are executed, [or] that he can use
the military against the citizen as a posse comitatus at all.
Id. Senator Hoar returned to his concern about implied powers:
[Y]ou have no right in dealing with your public officials, civil or military, to enact
a law the fair implication of which requires a course of conduct from them, and then
punish them as felons because they have done what they must have inferred fairly
by just and inevitable implication from your own legislation it was their official
duty to do.
Id. at 4243.
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the following day's debate, Senator Edmunds stated that the
requirement that the use of the troops be "expressly authorized"
would preclude use of the military to defend Army property, other
federal buildings, or "to protect [the] Commander-in-Chief in the
possession of his own office."'56 He added that there were no
statutes expressly authorizing use of the troops in such circum-
stances, but that such authority "depends upon the general duty
of the President of the United States to execute the laws and to
protect the public property.""' 7 Senator Teller sought to address
this matter by deleting the word "expressly.""' He added that
his amendment would permit use of the Army "as provided for by
law, either by direct enactment or by the authority that naturally
flows from the constitutional provisions with reference to the
Army.""' The Teller amendment, deleting the word "expressly,"
was adopted in a voice vote with the concurrence of Senator
Bayard, the original Senate sponsor of the Posse Comitatus
amendment. 6 " The debate surrounding this word goes directly
to the basic issue: whether Congress intended to limit the manner
in which the President exercises the inherent power to execute the
laws. The Senate debate strongly suggests a common understanding
by members on both sides of the issue that the word "expressly"
provided such a limitation; on the basis of that understanding, the
word was deleted from the Senate bill. 6' Senator Blaine offered
'~' Id. at 4295.
157 Id. Similar views were expressed by Senator Matthews, who suggested that the word
"expressly" rendered the statute an unconstitutional limitation on the powers of the Presi-
dent. Id. at 4297-98.
" Id. at 4296. Under Senator Teller's version, the exception would preclude employment
of the army to execute the laws: "[e]xcept in such cases and under such circumstances as
such employment of said force may be authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress."
Id.
15 Id. (remarks of Sen. Teller).
' Id. at 4302. Senator Bayard, the original Senate sponsor of the amendment, indicated
that he had not intended to limit the implied powers of the President:
I do not understand that there is a diminution of any power under the law or the
Constitution by this proposed section; it stands just as it is today. The honorable
Senator [Teller] from Colorado thinks that the word "expressly" is perhaps too
strong an expression, and that if the Army were necessarily employed it would be
a power lawfully exercised. I concur with him ....
Id. at 4296. He then agreed to accept a clarifying amendment:
As to the word "expressly," if my friend from Colorado thinks that it in any way
diminishes or restricts the just power of the President of the United States over the
Army of the United States, I will not object to its omission.
Id.
181 The Senate did not discuss extraterritorial application of the Act. The only discussion
of foreign policy considerations occurred when Senator Hoar, an opponent of the measure,
found it ironic that restrictions on the use of the Army were supported by Senator Maxey:
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an amendment to limit the restrictions in the Act to use of the
Army as a posse comitatus by deleting the phrase "or otherwise."'' 2
This was defeated by a vote of 25 to 21.163 The vote suggests a clear
congressional intent for the statute to apply to all unauthorized
uses of the Army in execution of the law, not simply cases in which
the Army is summoned by a marshal to act as a posse comitatus.
E. The Conference Report
Two days after the Senate completed action on the bill, with
adjournment rapidly approaching, the conference committee sub-
mitted its report on the legislation.'64 The House agreed to the Sen-
ate action in deleting the phrase "under the pretext" of enforcing
the laws to remove the implication that the bill was "a reflection
upon the past administration."'6 5 More significantly, the conferees
retained the Senate's reference to the Constitution, but restored the
House's requirement that exceptions be "expressly" authorized.6'
The conference report simply listed the specific amendments,
with no discussion of their substance. It is therefore necessary to
turn to the floor statements of the conference managers to assess
congressional intent. Speaking for the Senate managers, Senator
Sargent explained the modifications made by the conferees.,"
He offered the following explanation of the conference committee's
If those statements are true, the main effect of this section is to be to tie the hands
of the military commanders who have been placed on the Texan and Mexican
border in protecting citizens against wrongs or redressing them after they have been
inflicted; but of course if the gentlemen representing that State do not object to it,
it is not for our end of the Union to be specially interested on that subject.
Id. at 4303.
162 Id. at 4304.
Another floor amendment adopted during the debate established a requirement that any
act in violation of the statute be done "willfully and knowingly." As amended, the Bayard-
Keran amendment survived Senator Blaine's motion to strike it from the bill by a vote of 29
to 21. Id. Senator Blaine's subsequent motion to strike the criminal penalties from the bill
carried by a vote of 25 to 24. Id.
10 Id. at 4305. The Army appropriations bill, as amended, was approved in the Senate
by a vote of 42 to 9. Id. at 4307.
"I Id. at 4647-48.
165 Id. In addition, the conferees provided criminal penalties for willful violations. Id.
" Id. The final version of the amendment stated:
From and after passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the
Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of
executing the laws, except in such cases and under circumstances as such employ-
ment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of
Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the
expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section and
any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding
POSSE COMITATUS
action:
With reference to the word "expressly," we restored it and allowed
it to go in, so that now the employment of such force must be
expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress...
so that if the power arises under either the Constitution or the laws
it may be exercised and the Executive would not be embarrassed
by the prohibition of Congress to act where the Constitution re-
quires him to act; and the embarrassments would not have the
effect of restraining the action of an upright and energetic
Executive, but still might raise a question which he would desire
to avoid if possible. 18
His statement reflects the Senate's concern with preserving execu-
tive powers. Thus, if the "power" in question "arises under" the
Constitution, the requirement for express authority would be satis-
fied. No other member spoke on this matter, and the Senate
adopted the conference report by a voice vote.'69
In the House, Congressman Hewitt presented the conference
report.' 7 After noting that the House had receded on the size of the
Army and had substantially receded on other matters, he declared:
But these are all minor points and insignificant questions com-
pared with the great principle which was incorporated by the
House in the bill in reference to the use of the Army in time of
peace.
The Senate . . . had stricken out the word "expressly," so
that the Army might be used in all cases where implied authority
might be inferred. The House committee planted themselves
firmly upon the doctrine that rather than yield this fundamental
principle, for which for three years this House had struggled, they
would allow the bill to fail-notwithstanding the reforms which we
had secured; regarding these reforms as of but little consequence
alongside the great principle that the Army of the United States
in time of peace should be under the control of Congress and obedi-
ent to its laws. After a long and protracted negotiation the Senate
ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
Id.
167 Id. at 4648. Senator Sargent noted that without the Posse Comitatus amendment, "it
would have been impossible to come to any agreement on the Army bill." Id.
I Id. at 4648 (emphasis added).
leg Id.
I" Id. at 4684-86.
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committee has conceded that principle in all its length and
breadth, including the penalty which the Senate had stricken
out. 
17
With one exception not relevant here, 72 no other member ad-
dressed this provision. The legislation was approved in the House
by a vote of 154-58.173
Representative Hewitt's rejection of an exception based upon
implied authority reflects the restrictive view of the House during
the debate and raises the question whether it can be squared with
Senator Sargent's expansive view. Several aspects of the remarks by
the managers indicate that a common understanding can be de-
rived. Hewitt's statement emphasizing application of the statute
"in time of peace" is strongly suggestive of a congressional intent
not to interfere with the war powers of the President. His caveat is
similar to the position taken by the House sponsor of the original
amendment, Congressman Kimmel, who suggested that the war
powers were not within the scope of the amendment. This indicates
that where there is a constitutional power to act, and circumstances
under which the action would be taken can be dealt with only
through the application of military force, then the requirement for
express authority is satisfied.
From the Senate perspective, Senator Sargent's statement does
not suggest a blanket authorization to use federal troops simply
because a federal power "arises under. . . the Constitution." While
acknowledging that the statute would not restrain an "energetic
Executive," he added the important qualification that it "still
might raise a question which he would desire to avoid if possible.' '7
Under this view, if the Federal government has authority to act, and
necessity requires the application of military force, then it could be
used; otherwise, the use of military force should be avoided.
The context of the debate further underscores development of
a common theme. Debate focused on opposition to use of the mili-
tary in situations where the organized discipline and tactics of a
military force were not required, as for example, in the collection of
taxes, service of process, supervision of elections, and in response
to labor strife when the task was within the existing or potential
Id. at 4686 (emphasis added).
' Rep. House asked whether the provision requiring a willful violation was in the origi-
nal house bill. Id.
173 Id.
"' See text accompanying note 168 supra.
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capability of state forces. None of the amendment's sponsors
asserted that the requirement for express authority required specific
statutory mention of the armed forces when execution of an author-
ized Presidential responsibility required the application of military
force. With respect to extraterritoriality, Congress, in this debate,
did not exhibit concern about use of the troops in terms of the
President's war powers or otherwise in furtherance of American for-
eign policy.'
VII. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE ACIION
A. Amendments to the Act
Although the Act has not proved to be a major source of litiga-
tion, it has remained a constant feature of American military law.
Congress has considered the implications of the Act on several occa-
sions. In 1899, for example, Congress enacted a criminal code for the
territory of Alaska that contained an anti-riot provision proscribing
interference with law enforcement officials.Y6 The following year,
when Congress approved extensive legislation for the civil govern-
ment of Alaska, the anti-riot statute was amended to provide Alaska
with a blanket exemption from the Act. 77 Although the exemption
was not specifically debated,7 8 it appears to be related to the need
for vigorous federal presence in view of mob violence during the
Alaskan "gold rush.' 7 9
The Alaskan amendment is important in two respects. It shows
that 22 years after the passage of the Act, when the passions of the
Reconstruction Era had cooled, Congress viewed the Act as a viable
inhibition on a military role in law enforcement requiring a specific
exemption in circumstances where a military presence was consid-
ered desirable. The exemption also demonstrates that the Act is
I75 A further measure of congressional intent may be inferred from examining existing
executive practice. Prior to 1878, military forces had been used on dozens of occasions to
protect the lives and property of American citizens overseas. See J. MoFFUT, THE PROTEC-
TION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 9-64 (1928). In
light of this consistent pattern, an implicit curtailment of the presidential power to provide
such protection overseas should not be lightly inferred. The total absence of any discussion
of these matters in the debate, the focus on domestic law enforcement, and the assurances
of the sponsors that no change in law was intended by the amendment all lead to the con-
clusion that the Act was not intended to apply to the protection of American citizens and
property overseas.
"I, Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 429, § 363, 30 Stat. 1325 (1899).
177 Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 29, 31 Stat. 330 (1890).
'7' 33 CONG. REC. passim (1900) (debate on S. 3419, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900)).
'7' See Furman, supra note 7, at 110-11.
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more than an expression of the division of responsibilities between
federal and state officials. Without the exemption, the Act would
have applied to Alaska even though the entire area was under fed-
eral control.' 0 When the military laws of the United States were
codified and enacted into positive law in the mid-1950's, the Act was
revised and moved to title 18 from its unofficial codification in title
10.'' Following the grant of Alaskan statehood soon afterwards, the
exception for Alaska was removed at the suggestion of the House
Armed Services Committee.'12
B. Current Proposals
The latest congressional consideration of the Act has taken
place during the legislative action on proposals to revise title 18 of
the United States Code. During the Ninety-fifth Congress, the Sen-
ate approved the Criminal Code Act of 1978.'13 The Senate proposal
returned the Act to' title 10, declared a violation to be a misde-
meanor, made the Act applicable expressly to the Navy, and codi-
fied the understanding that the Act does not apply to the law en-
forcement functions of the Coast Guard.8 4
'" See id. In contrast to the exemption for Alaska, the Posse Comitatus Act became
applicable in the territory of Hawaii at the same time. See id.
"I Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, ch. 1041, § 18, 70A Stat. 626 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1976)). The relevant legislative history is contained in two sentences: "This
section is revised to conform to the style and terminology used in title 18. It is not enacted
as a part of title 10, United States Code [see 10 U.S.C. § 15 (1926)], since it is more properly
allocated to title 18." H.R. REP. No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 727 (1955); S. REP. No. 2484,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 736 (1956).
"I Alaska Omnibus Act, Pub. L. No. 86-70, § 17(d), 73 Stat. 144 (1959). The legislative
history of this provision is brief. The report of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs states that the measure "was added by the committee at the suggestion of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services to eliminate a provision in title 18, [U.S.C.] section 1385, which
permits the use in Alaska, but not elsewhere in the United States, of members of the Army
and Air Force as a Posse Comitatus." H.R. REP. No. 369, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959). The
Senate Report stated: "At the present time no part of the U.S. Army or the Air Force may
be used as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws, except in Alaska. The amend-
ment would eliminate the exception for Alaska." S. REP. No. 331, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1675, 1681.
"I S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House did not act on the proposal and the
legislation died at the end of the 95th Congress. Senate action in the 96th Congress has been
deferred pending House action on the proposal. At the time of publication of this Article, the
House Judiciary Committee was engaged in drafting legislation, but no formal committee
action had been taken. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1979, § A, at 22, cols. 1-5.
IRA The proposed Posse Comitatus Act provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, knowingly uses any part of the Army, Navy, or Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws is guilty of a class A
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A separate provision of the proposed Criminal Code Act, sec-
tion 3003 of title 18, provided limited extraterritorial authority for
the Armed Forces to engage in law enforcement activities in matters
subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States.' 5
The committee report stated that the provision was necessary be-
cause of possible extraterritorial application of the Posse Comitatus
Act.' 8 The report did not refer to cases, administrative opinions, or
legislative history in reaching this conclusion, however."' Instead,
the report merely cited an article by Jan Horbaly and Miles Mullin
which concluded that the Posse Comitatus Act would apply outside
the United States under the new Criminal Code."" In reaching
their conclusion, Horbaly and Mullin derived some support from
past administrative practice, but relied primarily on the expansion
of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States courts as
proposed in the original draft of the legislation prepared by the
misdemeanor. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the law enforce-
ment functions of the United States Coast Guard.
S. 1437, supra note 183, § 301(a)(1). The committee report provides little additional informa-
tion:
18 U.S.C. 1385 is reenacted and redesignated as 10 U.S.C. 127, . amended to
conform the culpability language and to make the offense a Class A misdemeanor
rather than a 2-year felony, [and] [a]mended to apply to all armed forces, at
suggestion of the Department of the Air Force. The provision also makes clear that
it is not intended to affect the law enforcement functions of the Coast Guard.
S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1234 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
'1 S. 1437, supra note 183, § 101. The proposal provides that: "The armed forces of the
United States may be used outside the United States to assist a law enforcement agency in
the detection, investigation, and preparation for trial of and in the apprehension of offenders
for, offenses subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States." Id.
' SENATE REPORT, supra note 184, pt. 1 at 946-47 (citation omitted). The committee
report provides the following explanation for the extraterritorial exception:
The Posse Comitatus statute contains a general prohibition on the use of the armed
forces to execute the laws. Currently it is unclear whether the statute applies, or
was intended to have application, outside the United States. Whatever the present
state of the law, the Committee believes that it is appropriate to carve out an
exception so as to permit the use of military authorities for law enforcement pur-
poses in the case of crimes committed outside the United States over which extra-
territorial jurisdiction is present.
Id.
In Id. at 947 n.11.
IRA Id. (citing Horbaly & Mullin, supra note 23, at 77-91). Horbaly and Mullin had
suggested amending the proposed Code expressly to permit use of the military in law enforce-
ment activities related to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States, a suggestion
substantially adopted by the Senate. Compare Horbaly & Mullin, supra, at 77-91 with
SENATE REPORT, supra note 184, pt. 1 at 947.
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National Commission on the Reform of the Federal Criminal
Laws."9
Although there may be some doubt whether the jurisdictional
provisions of the Senate bill compel the conclusion that the revised
Posse Comitatus Act would be given extraterritorial effect, 9 ' the
"I Horbaly & Mullin, supra note 23, at 88-91. Horbaly and Mullin provided the following
analysis:
The extraterritorial jurisdiction provision, section 204, states that an offense is
committed within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States unless the
offense is committed within the general jurisdiction of the United States or unless
a statute, treaty or international agreement provides otherwise. Additional jurisdic-
tional prerequisites are set out in the section and at least one must be satisfied if
extraterritorial jurisdiction is to attach. Each prerequisite is a separate ground upon
which extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offense may be asserted and if one prere-
quisite is satisfied, extraterritorial jurisdiction will attach. Consequently, it will no
longer be necessary to look to the nature of the crime to determine whether it should
be applied extraterritorially.
This disunion is the result of a conscious effort to divorce questions of jurisdic-
tion from the nature of the substantive criminal offense. The Final Report of the
National Commission [on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws xii (1971)] specifically
recommended that federal jurisdiction be determined without reference to the na-
ture of the offense committed. By stating the jurisdictional base separately, this
result is achieved. Thus, the rationale of the court in Chandler, based on an exami-
nation of the substantive offense itself, will no longer be appropriate.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
"I0 The conclusion that extraterritorial application of the Posse Comitatus Act is com-
pelled by the jurisdictional provisions of the proposed Code is open to question in light of
developments subsequent to publication of the Horbaly and Mullin article. The Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, in its report on S. 1437, did not endorse completely the National Commis-
sion's position that jurisdiction would provide the only test of extraterritoriality; rather, with
specific reference to United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), the Report stated that
the legislation "is designed to provide additional clarity in this area and to obviate, at least
in large part, the need for courts to consider the extraterritorial implications of legislation."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 184, pt. 1 at 47 (emphasis added).
A strong argument can be made that the Posse Comitatus Act is outside the "large part"
of federal law where mere assertion of jurisdiction should create an extraterritorial effect. The
purpose of tying extraterritoriality to jurisdiction is to insure that conduct potentially harm-
ful to the United States or its citizens will be punished regardless of where it may occur. See
id. at 39. With respect to the Posse Comitatus Act, however, the underlying activity-law
enforcement-normally is not considered harmful to the government or United States citi-
zens; the determination whether military law enforcement activities overseas are harmful
depends upon congressional intent as to the scope of the Act, a determination that requires
use of the Bowman standards. See notes 52-61 and accompanying text supra. Moreover,
because extraterritoriality of the Posse Comitatus Act not only involves Bowman issues, but
also raises a potential conflict between executive and legislative powers, the mere fact that
an incident involves a federal public servant overseas should not necessarily provide extrater-
ritorial effect absent clear congressional intent.
Support for this position is suggested by § 201(b)(2)(C) of the proposed title 18, which
states that the extraterritorial principles of § 204 do not apply when "the offense is described
as a violation of, or involves conduct required by, a statute outside this title, or a regulation,
rule, or order issued pursuant thereto, in which case there is federal jurisdiction over the
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investigative authority provided by section 3003 of the Senate bill's
proposed revision of title 18 of the United States Code moots the
issue. Section 3003 would provide the armed forces with investiga-
tive authority outside the United States only with respect to
"offenses subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United
States."'' By expressly providing only limited authority, the Senate
created a strong implication that the Posse Comitatus Act would
otherwise be given extraterritorial effect, thereby precluding over-
seas investigations by the armed forces except for cases falling
within this provision or within another exception to the Posse
Comitatus Act. The failure to extend investigative authority for the
armed forces outside the United States to offenses subject to the
general jurisdiction of the United States courts would mean that the
armed forces could not be used to investigate such offenses.1 2
If the investigative authority passed by the Senate in the
Ninety-fifth Congress is enacted into law, it would lead to anoma-
lous results, which can be illustrated by two hypothetical cases. In
the first case, assume that a federal public servant initiates a crimi-
nal act, such as a fraud against the United States, within the United
States. During the course of the crime, the official is transferred to
a foreign nation where the criminal act is completed.- Under the
Senate bill, extraterritorial jurisdiction would attach under either
subsections (g) or (h) of section 204 of the proposed version of title
18.193 The armed forces would therefore be permitted to investigate
offense to the extent applicable under that statute." S. 1437, supra note 183, § 201(b)(3)(C).
The proposed Code takes the Posse Comitatus Act out of title 18 and places it in title 10. It
can be argued that placement outside title 18 means the Act should be interpreted by princi-
ples generally governing use of the armed forces. A full discussion of whether 201(b)(2)(C)
would completely remove the Posse Comitatus Act from the principles of § 204 is beyond the
scope of this Article.
S' 5. 1437, supra note 183, §101.
112 See Horbaly & Mullin, supra note 23. Horbaly and Mullin, whose work was cited
in the Senate Report as the basis for the investigative exception, suggest the exception in their
analysis:
[11f a government official in the United States requests or demands that the armed
forces investigate a criminal offense overseas . . . [tihat official has used the
military to execute the laws. Since the use was not authorized, the Posse Comitatus
Act has been violated. And since the use of the military was by the official who was
within the United States, the offense was committed within the general jurisdiction
of the United States.
Id. at 91.
113 See S. 1437 supra note 183, § 101. Subsections (g) and (h) of the proposed Code
provide:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, or by treaty or other interna-
tional agreement, an offense is committed within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
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the crime overseas under the investigative jurisdiction provided by
the limited exception to the Posse Comitatus Act under section
3003. For the second hypothetical, assume that the same person
commits the same crime, but that it is completed within the United
States. After completion of the crime, the individual is transferred
overseas. Under the jurisdictional provisions of the Senate bill,' the
crime would fall under the general or territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, but not within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Inves-
tigation by the armed forces overseas would not be authorized ex-
pressly because the offense would not come within the investigative
authority provided by proposed section 3003.
This anomaly makes little sense in light of the Senate's purpose
in creating section 3003. The Senate Judiciary Committee's report
states that use of the armed forces under the exception not only
provides a means for enforcing the bill's expanded extraterritorial
jurisdiction, but also "is efficient in comparison to paying the bill
for investigations to be conducted overseas by employees of law
enforcement agencies normally stationed within the United
States.11 g15 The report does 'not state why this reasoning should not
apply with equal force to offenses committed within the general
jurisdiction of the United States when investigation must take place
overseas. In the absence of a civilian law enforcement capability
overseas, it is difficult to argue that the purpose of the Posse Comi-
tatus Act would be compromised by permitting military law en-
forcement activities overseas. Section 3003 should be amended to
remove the limitation on investigative jurisdiction of the armed
forces based upon extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Senate action with respect to section 3003 provides some indi-
cation that Congress may give extraterritorial effect to the Act. The
Senate debate, however, provides little authority for the proposition
the United States if it is committed outside the . ..United States and:
(g) the offense is committed in whole or in part within the United States and
the accused participates outside the United States, or the offense constitutes an
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit an offense within the United States;
[or]
(h) the offense is committed by a federal public servant, other than a member
of the armed forces who is subject to court martial jurisdiction for the offense at
the time he is charged with the offense, who is outside the United States because
of his official duties . . ..
Id.
S. 1437, supra note 183, § 101 (18 U.S.C. § 201-204, as proposed).
"g SENATE REPORT, supra note 184, at 947.
[Vol. 54:1
POSSE COMITATUS
that the Act as it presently stands should be given extraterritorial
effect. "'
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Statutory language, judicial consideration, and administrative
interpretation
The text of the Posse Comitatus Act does not address the issue
of extraterritorial application, and no federal court has resolved the
issue in an authoritative manner. The military departments occa-
sionally have given the Act extraterritorial effect, but the practice
has been inconsistent. The Act has not been applied by the military
departments to limit executive action where the primary purpose or
effect was to further United States foreign policy or to protect Amer-
ican lives and property overseas. The Attorney General has not
issued a formal opinion on this matter.
B. Application of the principles of statutory construction and con-
sideration of the legislative history
There is a presumption against extraterritorial application of
federal statutes absent a clear expression of congressional intent to
the contrary. When construing a criminal statute governing the con-
duct of public officials, rebuttal of the presumption does not require
express legislative consideration of extraterritoriality; rather, the
test is whether the congressional purpose in enacting the statute will
be frustrated by failure to give the statute extraterritorial effect.
The doctrine of construing statutes to avoid constitutional questions
also is relevant because there is a potential clash of executive and
- Subsequent legislative statements concerning the enactment of an earlier statute are
not part of the legislative history and do not provide conclusive evidence of the intent of the
Congress that enacted the statute. E.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979). A
legislature is not a static entity. Its make-up, views and objectives are in a constant state of
flux and its posture on a particular issue at one point in time does not necessarily imply that
this was always the case. Although subsequent statements by a later Congress are not con-
clusive on the intent of an earlier one, they may provide some probative value. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973);
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). The weight is determined primarily from the
elapsed time between the first enactment and the subsequent interpretative statements.
Generally, interpretative statements promulgated years after the first enactment are not
accorded substantial probative value. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157 (1968). In view of the equivocal nature of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
statement, see note 186 supra, and the fact that it comes a century after enactment of the
Posse Comitatus Act, it should not be entitled to significant weight in providing evidence of
Congressional intent when the Act was approved in 1878.
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legislative powers over foreign affairs that might arise if the Act
were applied outside the United States.
Congressional consideration of the Act in 1878 reflected a major
national debate over whether the Army should be given an ex-
panded role in the field of law enforcement. The Act represented a
legislative rejection of the expanded role and a determination that
the armed forces should not be used to supplant or supplement law
enforcement actions within the capability of state officers or federal
civilian officials.
Congressional intent as to the meaning of the statute may be
summarized as follows:
-Congress intended that use of the troops in execution of the
laws be undertaken only when the federal government was other-
wise authorized to act;
-In matters normally within the province of state officials
and federal civilian officers, Congress intended that the executive
use the troops in execution of the laws only where use of the Army
was expressly authorized; and
-In matters necessarily requiring the application of military
force, Congress did not intend to establish a requirement for ex-
plicit mention of the Army when the federal government was other-
wise authorized to act.
The first two conclusions emerge from the legislative history.
Although the third conclusion is subject to some doubt,'97 it may be
tested by proposing the opposite conclusion-that Congress in-
tended to preclude the President from acting when executive action
was authorized by the Constitution and the only feasible means of
achieving the objective was through the application of military
force. Such an interpretation would create a constitutional confron-
tation of the first magnitude. When dealing with a statute in which
the entire focus of the debate was on law enforcement actions within
the capability of state officers and federal civilian officials, the lim-
iting principles applicable to constitutional litigation suggest rejec-
tion of a doctrine that would render the executive powerless to per-
form a constitutionally authorized duty.'9 8 Particularly with respect
"I Although several supporters of the amendment suggested that the President could not
act absent specific statutory authority, even when the state militia proved insufficient, none
of the sponsors expressly endorsed this view. See notes 134-139 and accompanying text supra.
"I This view does not mean that Congress intended that the President be the sole judge
of when permissible executive action necessarily requires the application of military force.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644-65 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (citing the Posse Comitatus Act as an example of congressional limitation on the
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to application of the military force pursuant to the President's war
powers or otherwise for the primary purpose of implementing Amer-
ican foreign policy, the intention to undermine Presidential powers
in the international sphere should not be inferred in the absence of
legislative history directed towards this end.
We must next turn to the question of a blanket extraterritorial
exemption. Even if the Act does not apply where military force is
necessarily required, does it preclude the use of the armed forces
with respect to American citizens overseas for the primary purpose
of enforcing federal criminal law? During the course of the debate
in 1878, there was no specific discussion of extraterritorial effect.
The rejection of an amendment concerning border activities does
not demonstrate congressional intent to give the Act extraterritorial
effect. Under the Bowman standard, however, express intent con-
trary to a purely territorial application is not necessary if effectua-
tion of the purposes of the statute would require extraterritorial
effect under the circumstances. A significant aspect of congressional
intent is illustrated by the remarks of Congressman Hewitt at the
conclusion of the debate. He declared that the bill embodied "the
great principle that the Army of the United States in time of peace
would be under the control of Congress and obedient to its
laws. . . . We bring you back . . . a report. . . restoring to this
bill the principle for which we have contended too long, and which
is so vital to secure the rights and liberties of the people. ' 'e
The rhetoric may be exaggerated, but the intent appears to be
that in order to guard the rights and liberties of the American people
against possible infringement by the Army, express authority for
any use of the military for law enforcement purposes is required.
This view would reflect traditional concern for civilian control of the
military. °° Under the Bowman principles of statutory construction,
it could be argued that this creates a limitation upon government
with no territorial dimension when applied to circumstances not
directly related to foreign policy considerations, as for example, in
an investigation and arrest of an American citizen abroad for viola-
power of the President "to use the Army for the purpose of executing the general laws"). The
extent to which congressional or judicial avenues would be available to review the validity of
such a determination is beyond the scope of this Article.
M' 7 CONG. Rc. 4686 (1878). This statement is typical of remarks in the debate empha-
sizing the rights of the American people. There is no suggestion in the debate that the
amendment would have any application to foreign nationals overseas. See section VI supra.
0 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 841-42
(Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 845-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tion of a penal statute having purely domestic consequences.
On the other hand, it could be argued that extraterritorial ap-
plication is not necessary to insure compliance with the central
purpose of the Act-precluding the military from supplanting or
supplementing civilian authorities as the primary instruments of
law enforcement. In contrast to domestic circumstances, there is no
major law enforcement role for state officials or federal civilian offi-
cers outside the United States. Accordingly, there is no significant
civilian function that would be usurped by the military should the
troops overseas be used to aid law enforcement efforts. Under such
circumstances, it is difficult to contend that rejection of extraterri-
torial effect of the Posse Comitatus Act "would. . .greatly curtail
the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large im-
munity. '20 1 From this perspective, there is no requirement under the
Bowman principles to give extraterritorial effect to the statute in
order to insure that the purposes of the legislation are fulfilled.
C. Summary
The purpose of the Posse Comitatus Act is to prohibit use of the
armed forces in circumstances where executive action is within the
authority and capability of state officials or federal civilian officers.
The Act does not preclude resort to military personnel, regardless
of territorial impact, in circumstances where: (1) the executive
branch is authorized to act; (2) the requisite action is not reasonably
within the capability of state officials or federal civilian officers; and
(3) proper execution of such action necessarily requires the applica-
tion of military force. With respect to actions by the executive
branch where the primary purpose or effect is to further United
States foreign policy or to protect American lives or property over-
seas, the Act should not be given extraterritorial effect. The use of
military personnel outside the United States for purposes of assist-
ing domestic law enforcement when there is no substantial foreign
policy interest presents a more difficult question. Under present
circumstances, however, in which no federal civilian agency has a
major role in the enforcement of domestic laws overseas, neither the
legislative history of the Act nor relevant principles of statutory
construction require that the Act be given extraterritorial effect.
201 Text accompanying note 61 supra (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1932)).
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